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CLAIM FUNDERS AND COMMERCIAL CLAIM
HOLDERS: A COMMON INTEREST OR A
COMMON PROBLEM?
Michele DeStefano*
Commercial claim funding, where funders invest in business disputes
in exchange for a percentage of any eventual settlement or judgment,
is a growing industry in the United States.  Funders may request con-
fidential information about the claim and litigation strategy both
before deciding to invest (to analyze the strength of the claim) and
during the course of the financial relationship (to manage the invest-
ment).  Further, these funders may work and communicate with
claim holders and lawyers about the claim. However, there has been
little caselaw and little in-depth analysis on whether—and in what cir-
cumstances—the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine
can be applied to protect communications, interactions, and work
shared with claim funders or developed between claim funders, law-
yers, and claim holders.  This Article attempts to fill that gap by ex-
ploring the way the doctrine has been applied in other contexts,
including patent law, public relations, and insurance, to predict how
the doctrine might be applied in the claim funding context.
Despite assumptions to the contrary, my analysis leads to two conclu-
sions.  First, there is more than one exception to waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege doctrine that might apply to protect
communications between claim funders, claim holders, and their law-
yers: the agency exception, the functional equivalence exception, and
the common-interest doctrine exception may all apply.  Second, de-
spite its breadth, the work-product doctrine may be determined inap-
plicable depending on (1) the test and analysis the court uses to
determine whether work-product protection applies, and (2) the
court’s approach to analyzing the common-interest doctrine—a doc-
trine that is more commonly associated with the attorney-client privi-
lege but that has been used by courts to demonstrate waiver of work-
product doctrine protection as well.
Understanding that interactions and communications between claim
holders, funders, and attorneys can be protected by the doctrine, the
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question is whether they should be.  Invariably, such an inquiry could
collapse into an analysis of whether we should allow claim funding at
all, and, for that matter, whether privilege doctrines should exist in
the corporate context.  Putting those questions aside, I tackle the nor-
mative question by analyzing whether the problems commonly asso-
ciated with commercial claim funding are intensified when the
interactions between claim holders, funders, and lawyers are pro-
tected.  Ultimately, I conclude that applying the exceptions to waiver
and the work-product doctrine may, instead of increasing the risks
and negative externalities of commercial claim funding, help to pro-
tect these interactions while simultaneously yielding benefits yet
explored.
As a result, I conclude with two recommendations: one doctrinal and
one practical.  First, I recommend that courts adopt one of the more
lenient interpretations of the common-interest doctrine.  By doing so,
both the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrines can be
consistently and predictably applied to protect communications at is-
sue in this context.  Second, I urge lawyers to carefully craft contracts
so that they include nondisclosure and statements of common interest
agreements.
In sum, I end with a word of caution.  Despite the doctrinal support
for the existence of a common interest between claim funders and
claim holders, because of the common problems associated with
claim funding and the common distaste for the commodification of
law, claim funders, claim holders, and their lawyers should approach
issues around confidentiality with caution.
INTRODUCTION
Claim funding—the provision of money to legal claim holders by
third parties to fund the pursuit of legal claims1—is an emerging in-
dustry in the United States.2  This industry includes both consumer
1. ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
1 (2012) [hereinafter ABA WHITE PAPER], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informa
tional_report.authcheckdam.pdf; see also STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITI-
GATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 1 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf
(explaining that alternative litigation financing is the “provision of capital (money) by nontradi-
tional sources to civil plaintiffs, defendants, or their lawyers to support litigation-related activi-
ties”); infra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.  Claim funding is also referred to as litigation
funding, alternative litigation funding, third-party funding, and litigation finance, among other
labels. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra, at 1 & nn.1–4.  This Article will generally use the term claim
funding, except when quoting different nomenclature.  For the justifications for using this term
over the others, see Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in
the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2796 n.22 (2012).
2. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
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claim funding (i.e., the outside funding of small personal claims)3 and
commercial claim funding (i.e., the outside funding of sophisticated
players who pursue business disputes),4 the latter of which is the focus
of this Article.  Although some states prevent claim funding by apply-
ing doctrines such as champerty and maintenance, over half allow
claim funding in some form.5
The structure and format of contracts between claim funders and
claim holders vary.6  Sometimes a funder has a very passive, hands-off
relationship with the claim holder and the litigation.  Other times, the
claim funder is more involved and plays a more active role.7  How-
ever, claim funders commonly request information about the claim or
the current or potential litigation strategy, regardless of the relation-
ship that is negotiated and before deciding to provide funding.  In-
deed, funders claim they conduct “extensive research before choosing
cases.”8  In order to evaluate the strength of the case, some funders
request confidential information.9  Moreover, after a contract has
been signed, claim funders may continue to request information that
might be considered confidential in order to monitor the health of
their investment.10  Further, if they have negotiated a more active in-
volvement in the management of the claim, the level and amount of
communication involving confidential information between the claim
holder and funder can increase.  When this happens, the question is
whether the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine will,
and should, protect from disclosure confidential information shared
with the funder before or after the execution of the funding
agreement.
3. This type of funding has been referred to as “law lending.” See GARBER, supra note 1, at
9–10.
4. See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 35–53 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 54–63 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part II.C (describing the different relationship types).
8. David Donovan, Litigation Finance Is Growing, but How Comfortable Should Lawyers and
Investors Be?, N.C. LAWS. WKLY., May 17, 2013, at 1, 13 (citing Richard Fields, chairman and
CEO of Juridica Capital, as stating this and that Juridica “only takes [cases] that have a high
likelihood of recovery”).
9. Some scholars debate whether confidential information sharing is necessary. See infra
notes 97–104 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 101–104 and accompanying text.
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Although a few cases have carefully analyzed the application of
these doctrines to the commercial claim funding context,11 little schol-
arship on the subject exists.12  This Article aims to fill this gap.
Currently, commentators often appear to presume that the attorney-
client privilege will not apply to communications and information
shared with claim funders (either before or after they have contracted
to provide funds to the claim holder).13  They purport that the com-
mon-interest doctrine cannot apply to funders and claim holders to
prevent waiver of the attorney-client privilege because funders and
claim holders share only a common business interest rather than a
common legal interest.14  Although this argument may have some
11. To date, only six cases have addressed these doctrines.  One case only addressed the attor-
ney-client privilege. See Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376–77 (D.
Del. 2010) (holding that attorney-client privilege did not apply prior to investing, because there
was no common interest between the claim funder and the party to the litigation).  One case
only addressed the work-product doctrine. See Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., Nos. 2:07-
CV-565-TJW-CE, 2:08-CV-478-TJW, 2011 WL 1714304, at *1–3 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011) (finding
that work-product doctrine protection was not waived).  Four cases addressed both (but one of
them rested on a technicality). See Memorandum Order at ¶¶ 3–4, Walker Digital, LLC v.
Google Inc., No. 11-309-SLR (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://scholar.google.com/
scholar_case?case=15350591429862704883&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr (finding a
common interest between a claim funder, IP Navigation Group, and the claim holder and stating
that any of the claim holder’s “communications protected by the attorney-client privilege or
work-product doctrine do not lose that protection simply because they have been disclosed to
IPNav”); Devon It, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
27, 2012) (finding that confidential information “including legal memoranda, drafts of pleadings,
motions, and briefs, and other filings” shared with the claim funder and “communications and
comments on draft agreements regarding the terms of potential financing” made by the funder
were protected from disclosure by the work-product doctrine and also by the attorney-client
privilege doctrine via the common-interest exception); Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 10
C 3770, 2014 WL 67340 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2014) (finding that documents shared with claim funder
for the purpose of obtaining litigation funding and communications with funder related to litiga-
tion funding were protected by the work-product doctrine but that attorney-client privilege was
waived); Bray & Gillespie Mgmt. LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 6:07-cv-222-Orl-35KRS, 2008
WL 5054695, at *1–3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2008) (denying attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection to communications between a claim holder and potential third-party investor
that did not subsequently invest based on procedural failure to assert protection on a question-
by-question basis); cf. Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work-Product
Doctrine, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2012) (explaining that “[a] body of law has not
yet developed dealing with the application of the attorney-client privilege or work-product doc-
trine to the involvement of ALF entities” and that case law on the subject is “scant”); See
generally infra notes 201–203.
12. At the time of writing this Article, an in-depth Westlaw search was conducted of the schol-
arship on this topic.  Only one article provided a thorough analysis of the application of either of
these doctrines to the claim funding context. See generally Giesel, supra note 11 (analyzing ap-
plication of the work-product doctrine).  Other scholars, however, have discussed the doctrines
but provided only peripheral analysis. See infra notes 106– 110, 227– 231, and accompanying
text.
13. See infra notes 106–110 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 106–110 and accompanying text.
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merit based on how courts have applied the common-interest doctrine
in other contexts,15 these commentators rarely, if ever, consider other
attorney-client privilege waiver exceptions that might apply, such as
the agency or functional equivalent exceptions.16
Many commentators and judges presume that the work-product
doctrine, unlike the attorney-client privilege, will protect communica-
tions shared with claim funders.17  However, this stance may be too
optimistic in light of the way the doctrine has been applied in other
contexts and the leeway courts have to deny work-product
protection.18
In short, the presumptions regarding the attorney-client privilege
and the work-product doctrine appear to be a bit misguided.  Analysis
of these doctrines outside of the claim funding context demonstrates
that the attorney-client privilege might not be waived and that work-
product protection might be denied in some situations involving com-
munications between claim holders and claim funders.  Apart from
the practical concerns, the normative question is whether courts
should allow either, or both, doctrines to be used to protect these in-
teractions and work created by the funder.  Presuming that we, as a
society, are going to allow commercial claim funding (and, hopefully,
begin to regulate it more carefully),19 why should we not allow these
interactions to be protected from disclosure?
Bracketing the debate over whether privilege doctrines should ap-
ply in the corporate context20 and whether commercial claim funding
15. In the claim funding context, one court has held that the common-interest exception does
not prevent waiver of the attorney-client privilege when confidential information is shared with a
claim funder. Leader Techs., 719 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See infra Part III.B (providing other examples of how work-product protection can be
denied or waived).  As discussed in Part III.B, there are two components to consider when ana-
lyzing the application of the work-product doctrine to this context: (1) whether the work created
by the funder is considered work product; and (2) whether work-product protection is waived
when work product is shared with the funder.
19. This Article presumes that the commercial claim funding industry will continue to grow in
size and acceptance. See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.  This Article also assumes
that regulation will mirror this growth. See generally DeStefano, supra note 1 (contending that
regulation is necessary to cabin some of the risks associated with claim funding).  Further, al-
though there are controversial issues involved in the funding of claims, this Article does not
attempt to address whether commercial claim funding should exist or be allowed but instead
assumes that commercial claim funding exists and is here to stay.
20. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the attorney-client privilege should be ap-
plied to corporations. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389–90 (1981) (citing
United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915)); cf. Timothy P.
Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 81 (2002) (“[T]he privilege—including the
corporate privilege—is here to stay in one form or another . . . .”).  Many scholars, however,
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should be allowed,21 one way to answer that question is to determine
whether protecting interactions between claim holders, funders, and
lawyers will exacerbate problems commonly associated with claim
funding.22  Two potential problems exist: claim funding could: (1)
threaten the independence of the lawyer by enabling uninterested par-
ties to have too much control and influence over claims and claim
holders; and (2) increase the litigation of nonmeritorious claims or
prolong settlement.
My analysis concludes that protecting interactions involving claim
funders does not necessarily increase the threat of these risks and, to
the contrary, might help prevent them.  Protecting these interactions
removes one of the reasons why funders might seek to become co-
clients with the claim holder or acquire the claims outright.23  More,
because funders will have more information, the risk of investment in
nonmeritorious claims or prolonged settlement may actually decrease.
Further, such protection may enable the funder to provide more non-
cash value to the claim and claim holder because the claim funder will
have debated the risks and benefits of applying the attorney-client privilege to corporations.
See, e.g., Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Partici-
pants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 222–32 (1989) (outlining the debate); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 206–34 (1988) (providing reasons why the privilege should
not be applied to corporations); John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 464–68 (1982) (identifying risks and benefits of
a corporate attorney-client privilege).  This Article begins with the assumption that the corpo-
rate attorney-client privilege should exist.  Of course, there is also debate over the breadth of the
corporate attorney-client privilege.  Indeed, I have argued in another article that the courts have
interpreted the exceptions to waiver of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context
both too narrowly and too broadly. See generally Michele DeStefano Beardslee, The Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege: Third-Rate Doctrine for Third-Party Consultants, 62 SMU L. REV. 727
(2009).  Re-addressing this argument is outside the scope of this Article.  Instead, this Article
asks first, whether the waiver exception doctrine—as written, interpreted and applied by courts
today—will apply to communications between lawyers, claim holders, and funders; and second,
whether it should given the potential issues related to claim funding.
21. Many scholars have analyzed whether claim funding should be allowed in the United
States and have identified problems associated with allowing claim funding. See, e.g., Susan
Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry that Has a Place in the United
States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 109–10 (2008); Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money:
The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 MERCER L. REV. 649 (2005); Anthony J. Sebok, The In-
authentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011) (contending that claim funding should be allowed);
Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1268, 1332–36 (2011); Vicki Waye, Conflicts of Interests Between Claimholders, Lawyers and Liti-
gation Entrepreneurs, 19 BOND L. REV. 225, 237 & n.56 (2007) (Austl.).  As mentioned infra, the
ABA developed a task force to analyze this debate. See infra note 52.
22. Of course there are other ways to analyze this question.  For example, an analysis based
on the purpose and history of the attorney-client privilege doctrine might be appropriate. See
supra note 20.  Alternatively, an analysis could be based solely on the public’s perspective and
desire for truth.
23. For a discussion about why this is a good thing, see infra Part III.B.
2014] CLAIM FUNDERS AND CLAIM HOLDERS 311
have more information about the claim and more protection when
sharing expertise and advice with the claim holder.  Thus, I recom-
mend that the presence or inclusion of the claim funder should not
serve as a waiver to either the attorney-client privilege or the work-
product doctrine.
In Part II of this Article, I provide an overview of claim funding:
what it is and what functions claim funders perform that bring privi-
lege and confidentiality issues to the forefront.  I categorize the poten-
tial types of relationships that claim funders have with claim holders
by the degree of influence funders have over the claim—from a more
passive investment in a claim to one in which the funder essentially
takes control of the claim.
In Part III, I examine the judicial treatment of the attorney-client
privilege and work-product doctrines in the claim funding context.
Because there is scant case law, I also look to cases from other con-
texts (i.e., public relations, patent law, and insurance) and analyze
their potential applicability to situations involving claim funding.
Utilizing the typology identified in Part II, I describe the claim fund-
ing relationships and situations that might justify the application, or
denial, of privilege or work-product protection based on the doctrinal
parameters.  In so doing, I demonstrate that many presumptions
about how courts will apply either doctrine are misplaced.  Further, I
show that the doctrines can be interpreted to apply in certain situa-
tions to protect communications between claim funders, claim hold-
ers, and their lawyers.
In addition to addressing the doctrinal questions, in Part IV, I ad-
dress a normative inquiry: Should courts interpret the doctrines to en-
able such protection?  In order to prevent the analysis from collapsing
into one about whether commercial claim funding should be allowed
or whether there should exist privilege doctrines in the corporate con-
text, this Part attempts to determine if the common problems associ-
ated with commercial claim funding are exacerbated when
communications and interactions between lawyers, claim holders, and
funders are protected.  I conclude that this is not necessarily the case,
and to the contrary, there may be potential benefits to protecting
communications between funders and claim holders.
In Part V, I conclude with doctrinal and practical recommendations.
First, I recommend that the common-interest exception be interpreted
so that it applies to the relationship between claim funders and claim
holders.  Although analysis of the doctrine demonstrates that the com-
mon-interest exception should not be applied when parties only share
a commercial interest, there is plenty of support for applying it to situ-
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ations in which legal and business interests are intertwined.  Applying
this interpretation of the common-interest exception will ensure that
attorney-client privilege protection is available so that funders can
make informed decisions about whether to fund a case—even before
it is a case (i.e., before work-product protection may be applicable).
Further, given that courts infuse the work-product determination with
a common-interest analysis, such a move will enable protection when
funders are evaluating whether to continue to fund a case.  It will also
ensure that work-product protection applies in situations where the
funder is lending law-related expertise and creating work to help with
the litigation.
Second, I recommend that—until more cases have been tested and
the contours of the law have been better defined—claim funders,
claim holders, and lawyers proceed with caution when setting up con-
tractual agreements and sharing confidential information.  While cre-
ating a more active and interactive relationship between the funder
and the claim holder can increase the chances of attorney-client and
work-product protection (and perhaps increase the value that the
funder provides), it can also increase the chances that a court holds
the funding contract void as against public policy because of the level
of influence the funder has over claim management and the general
distaste that many commentators and courts have expressed about
claim funding.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What Is Commercial Claim Funding?
Claim funding (also commonly referred to as alternative litigation
funding) is the provision of money to legal claim holders by third par-
ties to fund the pursuit of legal claims.24 It is generally a type of nonre-
course financing.25  Parties unrelated to a lawsuit offer to provide
24. See supra note 1.
25. Sometimes the loans are recourse, but generally they are not. See, e.g., GEOFFREY MC-
GOVERN ET AL., UCLA/RAND CTR. FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS:
THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AND CLAIM TRANSFER: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2010) [hereinafter CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS], available at http:/
/www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2010/RAND_CF272.pdf; see also MC-
GOVERN ET AL., Stakeholders and Products in Third-Party Funding Arrangements: Summary of
Remarks by Selvin Seidel, Partner, Burford Advisors, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 4;
MCGOVERN ET AL., Professional Ethical Issues in Third-Party Litigation Financing: Summary of
Remarks by Nathan M. Crystal, Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Charleston Law School,
in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 15; MCGOVERN ET AL., Sources and Structures of Claim
Investments, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 11.
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funds to the claim holder without recourse if the claim holder loses.26
If the claim holder prevails, the claim funder receives a percentage of
the proceeds or settlement in return for taking on the risk of the
loan.27  The amount the claim funder receives is generally based on a
balance between time and the value of the case28 and is estimated to
be 20%–50% of the damages.29 Before actually funding the claim, the
claim funders perform due diligence, which is sometimes referred to
as “scrubbing” the case.  In fact, due diligence is a key part of the
process because many commercial claim funders do not have a large
enough portfolio of cases to employ a diversification strategy.30  Ac-
cordingly, claim funders analyze damages, liability, ability to pay, fee
arrangements with the law firm, and potential expenses.  They per-
form background checks on the lawyers and the claim holders.  Claim
funders also hire experts in financial modeling to predict the potential
recovery against length of time of investment.  Additionally, they hire
experts in the subject area of the litigation to advise on the merits of
the case, the strength of the evidence, and the strategy that the law-
yers are taking.  These experts investigate the law in the related mar-
kets to understand the risks of champerty, maintanence, or barratry,
which have the effect of voiding any agreement between the claim
holder and claim funder.31
26. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 6.  For this reason, some courts have held that claim
funding agreements are not loans and, therefore, not subject to usury laws. See, e.g., Dopp v.
Yari, 927 F. Supp. 814, 824 (D.N.J. 1996); Kraft v. Mason, 688 So. 2d 679, 683-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996); Nyquist v. Nyquist, 814 P.2d 515, 518 (Mont. 1992); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l,
Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 98-99 (Tex. App. 2006). But see, e.g., Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC
v. Suthers, No. 10-CV-8380, slip op. at 6 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 28, 2011) (order granting partial
summary judgment), available at http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/
press_releases/2011/09/29/oasis_order.pdf (holding that “the transactions” between the funder
and claim holder “create debt under the plain language of the UCCC” and “are ‘loans’ governed
by the UCCC”); Lawsuit Fin., L.L.C. v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233, 238-40 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
27. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 6.
28. JOHN BEISNER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS,
BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2009), availa-
ble at http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf (explaining that the
share of recovery can be calculated based on the value of the case and the time estimated for the
case to be resolved along with the amount originally advanced and whether the case goes to trial
or settles); see also Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural
Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 93 (2010).
29. This estimate is based on my experience working as a consultant in the industry and dis-
cussions with other consultants and industry leaders.
30. W. Bradley Wendel, Alternative Litigation Finance and Anti-Commodification Norms, 63
DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 663 (2014) (explaining the extensive due diligence that commercial claim
funders conduct and why it is important).
31. For descriptions of the types of due diligence, see Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in
Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 592 & n.150, 593
& n.155, 597 & nn.183–184 (2010). See also GARBER, supra note 1, at 26; Jonathan T. Molot, A
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Claim funding is currently offered in both the consumer and com-
mercial contexts.32  This Article focuses on commercial claim funding:
sophisticated players funding business disputes involving intellectual
property, patent disputes, contracts, arbitration, shareholder suits, and
antitrust.33  Two hypothetical examples illustrate commercial claim
funding:
Hypothetical A: Tiny Company patents a special technology for
tracking a location on a mobile device for use in a mapping app on a
tablet.  Big Phone Technology Company begins using the patented
technology without a license.  Tiny Co. does not have the resources
to sue Big Phone and will go bankrupt if it tries.  Commercial claim
funders provide money to keep Tiny Co. afloat and help fund the
lawsuit.34
Hypothetical B: Small U.S. Company, founded by people with con-
nections to the government of a foreign country with oil fields, en-
ters into a collaboration agreement to partner with Large U.S.
Petroleum Company to jointly pursue the opportunity and share
any interests (30% to Small U.S. Company and 70% to Large U.S.
Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 387–90 (2009); Aaron Katz & Steven Schoen-
feld, Third-party Litigation Financing: Commercial Claims as an Asset Class, PRAC. L.J., Mar.
2012, at 36, 45, available at http://www.parabellumcap.com/docs/March2012_ThirdPartyLitiga
tion.pdf (contending that rates vary based on the strength of the claim, risk of collection,
amount, and duration).  Similar factors are considered in the consumer context. See The Ap-
proval Factors for Funding Personal Injury Lawsuits, OASIS LEGAL FIN., https://www.oasislegal.
com/legal_finance_services/lawsuit_funding_approval_factors?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport
=1 (last visited Oct. 4, 2013) (listing the approval factors for funding personal injury lawsuits); see
also Nicholas Beydler, Comment, Risky Business: Examining Approaches to Regulating Con-
sumer Litigation Funding, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1159, 1164 (2012) (explaining that funders “vet the
claim, looking at whether the plaintiff bears some responsibility for the injury that is the subject
of the litigation, the physical evidence of damage and ‘bright blood’ injuries, the sum of the
plaintiff’s medical and other bills associated with the injury, the result and jury verdict amounts
in cases involving similar injuries, and even the skill of the attorney handling the case”).
32. This Article focuses on funding agreements in the commercial context and agreements
between funders and claim holders.  Alternative litigation financing is also sometimes offered to
the lawyers or law firm, as opposed to the corporate or consumer claim holder. GARBER, supra
note 1, at 1 (explaining that there are three types: nonrecourse funding provided to individual
plaintiffs (consumer legal funding), loans to plaintiffs’ law firms, and investments in commercial
litigation).  However, when the loan is to the lawyer (as opposed to the claim holder) there may
be increased ethical and public policy issues.  DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2818 n.150 (“Commer-
cial claim funding agreements between funders and lawyers (or law firms) are rarer and more
problematic from an ethical and public policy standpoint.”).
33. Donovan, supra note 8, at 1.  Funds can be used to support commercial litigation, arbitra-
tion, collections of judgments, etc.
34. Unlike lawyers, claim funders can advance funds to claim holders to help with living or
business expenses. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2013) (prohibiting law-
yers from advancing funds to clients except for litigation or court costs). See Wendel, supra note
30, at 662 (explaining a similar scenario and contending that such a “company may lack the
liquidity necessary to finance litigation on an hourly fee basis, and the lawyers who are equipped
to fund litigation on a contingent fee basis may be unaccustomed to handling the types of claims
involved”).
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Petroleum Company).  Pursuant to their contract, Small U.S. Com-
pany works jointly with Large U.S. Petroleum Company to obtain a
concession from the government.  After the concession is received,
Large U.S. Petroleum Company secretly signs an agreement with
the government but fails to give effect to Small U.S. Company’s in-
terests under the collaboration agreement.  Thereafter, suit is filed
in the United Kingdom.  A commercial claim funding company then
pays the security for costs (under the “loser pays” rule in the UK)
and provides funds to continue the litigation and keep Small U.S.
Company in business.
B. Status of Commercial Claim Funding in the United States
Although claim funding is prevalent and widely accepted in both
the United Kingdom and Australia,35 it is considered an emerging in-
dustry in the United States.36  Some states completely outlaw claim
funding by nonlawyers via the common law doctrines of maintenance,
champerty, and barratry.37  Other states have abolished these doc-
35. Wayne Attrill, Ethical Issues in Litigation Funding 1 (Nov. 12, 2008) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.claimsfunding.eu/uploads/media/Ethical_Issues_Paper.pdf; see
also Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386, 486–87 (Austl.)
(upholding claim funding agreement wherein the funder had a level of control and influence
over case management); Domson Pty Ltd. v Zhu [2005] NSWSC 1070 ¶¶ 71–77 (Austl.); STAND-
ING COMM. OF ATTORNEYS-GEN., LITIGATION FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA: DISCUSSION PAPER 4
(2006) (discussing the role of litigation funding firms); Nikki Tait, Lawyers Test Litigation Fund-
ing Waters, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 5, 2007, at 1 (“Litigation funding . . . has become more
established in some overseas jurisdictions, notably Australia.”).  Claim funding is also allowed in
both Germany and Switzerland. See Andreas Frischknecht & Vera Schmidt, Privilege and Confi-
dentiality in Third Party Funder Due Diligence: The Positions in the United States and Switzer-
land and the Resulting Expectations Gap in International Arbitration, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT.,
Oct. 2011, at 1, 16, available at http://www.chaffetzlindsey.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/tv8-
4-article04.pdf.  For a synopsis of the state of claim funding in the United Kingdom and Austra-
lia, see DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2821–23.
36. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 5; see also id. at 39 (“The market for alternative
litigation finance involves suppliers and customers who demand this form of financing.  Because
of this demand, and because of the complexity of regulation in various jurisdictions, the specific
form of ALF transactions will undoubtedly continue to evolve.”).  For trends in litigation fund-
ing, see Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 754–59, 788–97 (dis-
cussing both traditional and emerging law firm models).
37. See, e.g., MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333–34 (Va. 1998) (citing Goodley
v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Ct. App. 1976)). See generally In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978) (“[M]aintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is
maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing
practice of maintenance or champerty.”); ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 9 (“Champerty is
considered a type of maintenance.”).  For a description and analysis of these doctrines in the
claim funding context, see generally Richmond, supra note 21, at 652–69.  Some courts invalidate
agreements that assign the cause of action itself but approve those that assign a portion of the
proceeds because they can be viewed as an enforceable equitable assignment similar to an insur-
ance contract. See Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 85–87; see also Costanzo v. Costanzo, 590 A.2d
268, 271 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).  Other courts claim that there is no distinction. See,
e.g., Karp v. Speizer, 647 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Town & Country Bank of
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trines.38  However, as will be discussed in more detail in Part IV, even
in the jurisdictions that allow claim funding, courts can refuse to up-
hold claim funding agreements for violating public policy if the funder
has too much control or influence over litigation decisions.39
Despite the doctrinal limitations, claim funding has been in exis-
tence—at least in some form—for quite some time, even in the United
States.  For example, nonrecourse loans have been offered to law
firms and their clients for years.40  Transfers of patent claims,41 insur-
ance contracts, and claims in bankruptcy proceedings have been al-
lowed for years.42  Contingency fee arrangements, which have been
accepted for decades in the United States in most kinds of cases, are
not unlike alternative litigation funding arrangements.43  Indeed, both
types of funding could be considered a share of the proceeds of a judg-
Springfield v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 459 N.E.2d 639, 640–41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); see also Sebok,
supra note 21, at 121–22 (“[T]he common law of the United States embraces free assignability in
all choses of action except personal injury . . . legal malpractice (except when it does), and fraud
(except when it does).”).
38. See Sebok, supra note 21, at 98–99, 99 n.162 (specifying that twenty-eight jurisdictions
allow champerty with some limitations); see also Paul Bond, Comment, Making Champerty
Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297, 1333–41 (2002).
39. See, e.g., Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 104 (Tex. Ct. App.
2006); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2012); ABA WHITE PAPER,
supra note 1, at 23 (“Even in states permitting an ALF supplier to obtain an interest in a party’s
cause of action, retention by the supplier of control over the decision-making of the party and its
counsel, via a contractual provision between the supplier and the party, may be deemed unlawful
as champerty or maintenance.”); infra note 77; infra discussion in Part IV.A.  For a thorough
review of the doctrine and its history, see generally Sebok, supra note 21. For a review of recent
cases and legislation related to claim funding, see Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Con-
tract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 460 n.6 (2012).
40. See Letter from John H. Beisner, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, to Comm’n Mem-
bers, ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Feb. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Beisner Letter], in WORKING
GRP. ON ALT. LITIG. FIN., ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, COMMENTS: ALTERNATIVE LITIGA-
TION FINANCING WORKING GROUP ISSUES PAPER 136, 137–38 (2011) [hereinafter WORKING
GRP., COMMENTS], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011
_build/ethics_2020/comments_on_alternative_litigation_financing_issues_paper.authcheckdam.
pdf.
41. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
42. For further discussion of this analogy, see DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2838–41. See also
infra notes 93, 206, 218–219, and accompanying text.
43. See Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent
Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (1970); see also William R. Towns,
U.S. Contingency Fees—A Level Playing Field?, WIPO MAG., Feb. 2010, at 3, 3, available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/wipo_magazine/en/pdf/2010/wipo_pub_121_2010_01.pdf
(claiming “contingency fee arrangements in U.S. civil litigation ha[ve] become widespread” and
have been around for 100 years).  The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform rejects this
analogy. See Beisner Letter, supra note 40, at 138–39.  For further discussion of this analogy, see
DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2834–38.
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ment or settlement of a legal claim.44  In a contingency fee arrange-
ment (like a claim funding arrangement), there is no pre-established
interest rate for borrowed funds.  Instead, in exchange for funds, the
funder is provided only the promise of recovery of the principal along
with a percentage of the profit if, and only if, the claim holder
prevails.45  In other words, it is similar to claim funding because no
obligation exists to pay the money back in the event that the claim
holder loses the case.
Furthermore, the claim funding industry has been funding cases for
over twenty years in the United States.46  In the consumer context, for
example, some of the most well-known class action cases involving
pharmaceuticals and asbestos were funded in part by third parties.47
In the commercial context, third-party claim funders provided financ-
ing to the Ecuadorian case against Chevron.48  Today, between thirty
and eighty companies in the United States offer claim funding.49
44. See Stewart Jay, The Dilemmas of Attorney Contingent Fees, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 813,
814 (1989) (“All [contingent fees] share the basic feature that the lawyer receives a fee for ser-
vices only if there is a monetary recovery by the client.  The fee is commonly based on a percent-
age of the recovery by the plaintiff, which could be the gross amount or a net amount recovered
after litigation expenses are deducted.  Alternatively, contingent fees can be hourly in nature,
meaning that the lawyer bills for the total hours spent on the case only if the representation has
been successful.”); see also Waye, supra note 21, at 262 (“[T]he funder is usually entitled to a
portion of the representative plaintiff’s damages as a success fee.  The success fee represents the
profit due to the funder for accepting litigation risk.”).
45. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 270 (1998) (“Thus, the lawyer effectively insures the client for the ex-
penses associated with pursuing a claim.  In addition to insuring for the out-of-pocket expenses,
the lawyer also insures the value of his or her time.  If the lawyer obtains no recovery for the
client, the lawyer absorbs the entire opportunity cost of the time expended on the case.”); see
also Jay, supra note 44, at 814.
46. See, e.g., Killian v. Millard, 279 Cal. Rptr. 877, 878 (Ct. App. 1991) (describing how the
plaintiffs were “[u]nable to personally finance their lawsuit” and thus “syndicated it by creating
50 ‘units’ for sale at $10,000 per unit with a 2-unit minimum per investor”); Susan Lorde Martin,
Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 498
(1992).
47. Martin, supra note 21, at 84 n.4 (“Nevertheless, it is fairly well known that many large
lawsuits, such as the vitamins anti-trust suit, the asbestos cases and the Vioxx cases, have been
supported by litigation financing companies which are funded by banks, private equity and
hedge funds.”); see also Alison Frankel, The Loan Arrangers, AM. LAW., Oct. 1, 2005, at 74.
48. Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2012, at 38, 43 (stating
that Burford Capital invested millions of dollars in the Ecuadorian case against Chevron); cf.
Burford Capital Profits Up 965%, STOCK MKT. WIRE (Apr. 4, 2012, 09:02 AM), http://www.
stockmarketwire.com/article/4343538/Burford-Capital-profits-up-965pct.html (reporting that
Burford expected net profits of $32 million after nine of its investments either concluded entirely
or completed trial in 2011).  For a review and analysis of Burford’s investment in this case, see
Steinitz, supra note 39, at 465–79.
49. Officers and Members, AM. LEGAL FIN. ASS’N, http://www.americanlegalfin.com/Officers
AndMembers.asp (last visited Aug. 24, 2013) (having at least thirty-two members); see also
GARBER, supra note 1, at 10 n.14 (noting that there might be as many as eighty).
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Some, like Burford Capital Ltd., Juridica Investments Ltd., and IMF
(Australia) Ltd., focus on the commercial claim industry, while others
focus on consumers.50  Insurance companies are also participating in
the industry by insuring these claim funding companies against loss of
the principal.51  Given its rising importance, the ABA Commission on
Ethics 20/20 formed a working group to analyze the professional is-
sues associated with alternative litigation finance.52  Even though al-
ternative litigation financing is considered new, and there are legal
restraints in many states, the claim funding industry could very soon
be worth over $1 billion in the United States.53
C. Types of Claim Funding Arrangements
Within the commercial claim funding context, funders negotiate dif-
ferent investment structures in different scenarios.54  First, contracting
50. See Michael G. Blum, Financial Management in a Contingent Fee Practice, FINDLAW (Mar.
26, 2008), http://practice.findlaw.com/financing-a-law-firm/financial-management-in-a-contin
gent-fee-practice.html.  Hedge funds also provide claim funding.  Margie Lindsay, Third-Party
Litigation Funding Finds Favour with Hedge Funds, HEDGE FUNDS REV. (Jan. 19, 2012), availa-
ble at http:// http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/news/120119.html; see also Steinitz, supra
note 39, at 461.  For example, Credit Suisse Group owns Peachtree Financial Solutions, which
“purchase[s] assets including structured legal settlements, annuities, lottery winnings, sports con-
tracts and life insurance policies.” About Us, PEACHTREE FIN. SOLUTIONS, http://peachtreefi
nancial.com/company/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2013).
51. For example, a claim financier could pay 10%–15% of the original investment to an insur-
ance agent to cover the loss of its principal should the claim fail, or it could set up a deal with the
insurer to share the proceeds. See Steinitz, supra note 39, at 461–62 (explaining that sometimes
these contracts are secured).
52. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 2.
53. See Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 (2011)
(“As of 2011, [the third-party litigation financing] industry has continued to grow, both as to the
number and types of lawsuits financed and financing provided.  The aggregate amount of litiga-
tion financing outstanding is estimated to exceed $1 billion.”); see also New York City Bar Gives
Thumbs Up to Litigation-Funding, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (June 20, 2011), availa-
ble at http://archive-com.com/page/481471/2012-10-19/http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com
/Legal/News/2011/06_-_June/New_York_City_Bar_gives_thumbs_up_to_litigation-funding/
(“The practice of seeking funding for cases from outside investors has been on the rise in the
past 20 years, the [New York City Bar Association] said.  It has moved from a cottage industry of
personal-injury cases to a $1 billion business involving a wide swath of commercial litigation.”).
This growth has been predicted, in part, because of the “global recession, which has created
more claims but less funds to pursue them” along with “an appetite for new, alternative assets.”
Steinitz, supra note 39, at 459 n.2.  The Legal Profession Act of 2004 (NSW) ch 2, pt 2.6, div 2
(Austl.), which allows law firms to incorporate in Australia, and the Legal Services Act, 2007, c.
29, §§ 71-111 (U.K.), which allows outsiders to invest in law firms in the United Kingdom, have
also been identified as global transformations that have helped accelerate claim funding.  Stein-
itz, supra note 39, at 459 n.2.
54. For a list of types of funding, see PIA EBERHARDT ET AL., CORP. EUROPE OBSERVATORY
& TRANSNAT’L INST., PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND FINAN-
CIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM 56–60 (2012), available at http://
corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf.
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parties may vary; the contract can be between the lawyer and the
funder55 or, more commonly, between the claim holder and the
funder.  Second, the amount and structure of the funder’s recovery
can vary.  In some instances, the claim funder will negotiate a set per-
centage of recovery after the principal is repaid.  In other cases, the
funder will negotiate a recovery that is akin to a waterfall: as the rate
of return increases, so does the percentage of the recovery to the
funder.56  Further, although claim funders often purchase an interest
in the outcome or judgment, some will purchase the claim asset itself
or a portion of it.57  Some funders offer to provide funds in exchange
for a percentage of a claim as security for the investment.58  These
funds can be used for purposes unrelated to litigation or to the claim
that was used as collateral.59  Third, funding may be provided in
stages,60 and there may be multiple parties involved in the funding.
For example, funders may co-finance with other funders, and law
firms may work with other law firms under co-counseling arrange-
ments.61  Last, claim funders negotiate different levels of influence
and control over the management of the litigation.62  In the next sub-
55. See, e.g., Legal Asset Funding v. Veneski, No. 3:04-CV-01156, 2006 WL 2623884, at *1–2
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2006); see also supra note 32.
56. For a summary of the waterfall deal that Burford Capital Ltd. had with the claim holders
in the Chevron-Ecuador case, see Roger Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, FOR-
TUNE, June 13, 2011, at 68, 70; see also Neil Rose, Whatever You Want, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE
(Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/2326.article (“This is very much a bespoke
market.”).
57. See supra notes 25–27; see also Steinitz, supra note 39, at 461 (explaining that “these, in
turn, may be directly or indirectly syndicated”).  To view a claim funder’s investment structuring
offerings, see BURFORD CAPITAL LTD., PLACING OF 80,000,000 ORDINARY SHARES AT A PRICE
OF 100 PENCE PER ORDINARY SHARE AND ADMISSION TO TRADING ON AIM 21–22 (2009)
[hereinafter BURFORD ADMISSION DOCUMENT], available at http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/burford-admission-document.pdf.
58. See Andrew Langhoff, Innovation in Litigation Finance: Moving Beyond Classic Litigation
Funding, ON REFLECTION (Burford Capital Ltd., New York, N.Y.), Nov. 20, 2012, at 2, available
at http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Burford-article-Innovation-2ppV
1.3web.pdf.
59. Id. (explaining that this is an innovation in litigation finance).  For a description of other
ways claim funding is utilized, see id. at 1–2.
60. See Steinitz, supra note 39, at 467–68 (citing Treca Financial Solutions and Claimants
Funding Agreement ¶¶ 2.1(a), 3(h) (Oct. 31, 2010) [hereinafter Treca Agreement]) (describing
Burford’s first round of investment).
61. Id. at 461–62.  The Chevron-Ecuador case was co-funded. See Chevron’s Memorandum of
Law in Support of Its Motion for an Order of Attachment and Other Relief at 13–14, 14
nn.12–13, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 840 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-Civ-0691
(LAK)) (listing additional individuals and entities investing anywhere from $50,000 to $1
million).
62. See Sebok supra note 21, at 109 (explaining that “[t]he degree of control the investor
obtained by contract can, in theory, extend over a spectrum ranging from relatively minor con-
trol (for example, control over what documents the investor can see) to almost complete control
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part, I categorize the types of relationships—passive or active—that
claim funders can have with claim holders.63
1. Passive
One claim funding model is “passive investment.”  In this model, a
company, such as Burford Capital Ltd., Juridica Investments Ltd., or
IMF (Australia) Ltd., provides funds to a claim holder to advance the
claim but takes a hands-off approach after investment.64  Essentially,
the claim funder scrubs the case to ensure that it is worthy of the in-
vested capital.  It employs experts to evaluate the claim, perform due
diligence and underwriting to “value” the claim, and ensure that the
likelihood of success is larger than the likelihood of failure.  It pro-
vides funding for the obvious wins (e.g., the airline that has been
taken over by a corrupt government but cannot afford to litigate and
keep its doors open).65
In many ways, deciding to fund is like placing a bet on a horse.66
After learning everything possible about the horse and its jockey, a
(for example, control over selection of counsel or veto power over settlement)”); see also Waye,
supra note 21, at 236 (explaining that “[t]he arrangements made between litigation funders,
claim holders and legal practitioners vary in the degree of control exerted by the funder over the
prosecution of the claim, and in relation to the nature of financial arrangements funders make
with legal practitioners”).
63. These categorizations are broad strokes.  There are obviously variations, and the differ-
ences between the three identified models may not be as concrete as portrayed here but they
serve as a useful lens through which to analyze the debate over privilege and work-product
protection.  Other scholars have in fact identified different categories.  For example, Vicky Waye
identifies two models of claim funding: one in which the funder takes total control and one in
which the claim holder maintains control over the management of the claim and the lawyer.
Waye, supra note 21, at 249–50.  At first blush, it appears that her models map onto those in this
Article, but they are slightly different. See id. at 243 n.82 (“Delegation of complete control may,
however, still amount to de facto assignment and facilitate trafficking in legal claims, which re-
mains contrary to public policy.”).  Although Waye clearly sees the level of control on a contin-
uum, see id. at 254–55, Waye’s rubric does not envision a funder that is solely passive. Id. at 249
(“The funder is an investor in the claim, and unlike passive shareholders in large public compa-
nies, is a careful monitor of its interests, and in some cases exerts considerable influence over
claim management.” (footnotes omitted)).  Instead, Waye’s second model is more akin to that
described as the “active” funder here.  This may be in part because it is extremely difficult for a
funder to remain completely passive. See infra notes 74–81.
64. See ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 23 (explaining that “some ALF suppliers dis-
claim any control over the decision-making of lawyers, stating that they are in an entirely passive
role”); see also Martin, supra note 21, at 109 (stating that “in the United States, litigation funders
merely advance money to plaintiffs to use any way they wish; they do not directly fund the
litigation at all, a role that is, however, permitted for U.S. attorneys”).
65. See Part II.A (providing hypotheticals on “obvious wins”).
66. This is not to say that claim funding is akin to gambling. See generally Anthony J. Sebok,
Betting on Tort Suits After the Event: From Champerty to Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 453,
471 (2011) (arguing that alternative claim financing is not a form of gambling because “the fact
that a contract conditions the award of money on the occurrence of an uncertain event tells us
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decision is made whether to bet on the horse, and after the bet is
made, the bettor sits on the sidelines and watches the race.  The bettor
neither coaches from the sidelines nor gets involved in decisions about
how to ride the horse or manage the course or jockey.  Similarly, after
deciding to provide funding, a funder in this model does not get in-
volved in choice of counsel, settlement, litigation strategy, or negotia-
tions.  Although the funder may have some influence on some of these
matters simply because funders are savvy business professionals and
often have years of experience as practicing attorneys67 this model is
predicated on the idea that the funder does not control any workings
of the resolution of the claim.68  To that end, claim funders assert that
they do not attempt to control any aspect of the litigation strategy,
settlement, or choice of lawyer.69  And some courts have upheld
agreements in part because the funder played a passive role.70  Thus,
in this model, the funder acts almost as a bystander—as a pure inves-
tor.  In that respect, passive claim funding could turn legal claims into
a commodity—an asset class that any outsider with the right resources
can invest in.71
However, it is slightly different than what has been coined “passive
investment” in the stock market.  In that situation, a passive investor
is one that owns stocks “because they think as a whole, over long peri-
ods of time, capitalism works, and they are likely to receive higher
returns from investing in the entire stock market than by trying to
pick the individual stocks which will outperform the market as a
nothing about whether, as a functional matter, the contract serves a socially useful function.  I
have argued further that champerty can be seen as a form of ‘after the event’ insurance for
victims of wrongful losses.”).
67. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
68. See Martin, supra note 21, at 109; see also Industry Best Practices—ALFA’s Code of Con-
duct, AM. LEGAL FIN. ASS’N, http://americanlegalfin.com/IndustryBestPractices.asp (last visited
Oct. 3, 2013).  But the funder may have some influence although it is not stated or guaranteed.
69. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 23 n.82 (“Burford does not hire or fire the lawyers,
direct strategy or make settlement decisions.  Burford is a purely passive provider of non-re-
course financing to a corporate party.” (quoting Submission of Christopher P. Bogart et al.,
Burford Group, LLC, to Working Grp. on Alt. Litig. Fin., ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Feb.
15, 2011), in WORKING GRP., COMMENTS, supra note 40, at 29, 33)); see also id. (“We do not seek
to control any of the decisions regarding the conduct of any litigation that we finance, nor are we
aware of any other supplier in this market segment who does.” (quoting Submission from Rich-
ard W. Fields, Juridica Mgmt. Ltd., to Working Grp. on Alt. Litig. Fin., ABA Comm’n on Ethics
20/20 (Feb. 17, 2011), in WORKING GRP., COMMENTS, supra note 40, at 66, 71)).
70. See, e.g., Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 104 (Tex. App.
2006) (“[T]here is no evidence that [the ALF suppliers] maintained any control over the Halli-
burton lawsuit.  The agreements do not contain provisions permitting [the ALF suppliers] to
select counsel, direct trial strategy, or participate in settlement discussions, nor do they permit
[the ALF suppliers] to look to Anglo-Dutch’s trial counsel directly for payment.”).
71. See infra Part IV.B.
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whole.”72  Although investors in legal claims may approach the mar-
ket in this way over time,73 currently even passive investors are not
that passive, at least not in the commercial context.  Instead, a legal
claim with a passive investor is more like an actively managed fund
wherein the analyst researches and staffs the fund.  In the passive con-
text, cases are researched, scrubbed, and hand selected.
Further, although funders argue that they play a completely passive
role and that courts rely on a funder’s passivity to justify upholding
funding agreements,74 it is not clear that complete passivity exists in
practice in the commercial context.75  First, it is only natural that the
lender will want to have some influence over the litigation.  As an
Australian justice explained, that “a person who hazards funds in liti-
gation wishes to control the litigation is hardly surprising.”76  Unsur-
prisingly, some states have enacted legislation that requires claim
funders to specify in contracts with claim holders that they will only
play a passive role.77  Second, even if the agreement stipulates that the
funder does not have any power or control, the reality is that the
funder likely will have some power and control because the funder is
providing funds to keep the litigation (and perhaps the company)
afloat78—not to mention that funders are often former practicing at-
72. Dana Anspach, What Is the Difference Between Active and Passive Investing?, ABOUT.
COM, http://moneyover55.about.com/od/howtoinvest/a/activevspassive.htm (last visited Oct. 3,
2013) (“[A]ctive investing [is] like trying to bet on who will win the Super Bowl, while passive
investing would be the ability to profit as all the NFL teams collectively made money on ticket
and merchandise sales.”).
73. See EBERHARDT ET AL., supra note 54, at 56 (“The whole theory is to take the legal system
and turn it into a stock market.” (quoting John H. Beisner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom)); see also id. at 58 (“There is even the possibility—heaven forbid—that we could fund a
case and then resell it to third parties, a bit like credit default swaps.” (quoting Selvyn Seidel,
Fulbrook Management)).
74. See, e.g., Haskell, 193 S.W.3d at 104.
75. Charles Silver, Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance: What’s the Difference?, 63
DEPAUL L. REV. 617, 633 (2014) (explaining that passive investing may more likely exist in the
consumer context when the amount of lending is fairly low, but not necessarily when the invest-
ments are much larger as they are in the commercial context); see also ABA WHITE PAPER,
supra note 1, at 24.
76. See, e.g., Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386, 434
(Austl.) (asserting that funders should be able to influence and exert the same level of control
over litigation as insurers).
77. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2012); cf. Richmond, supra
note 21, at 682 (“[T]he funding company should agree that it will neither attempt to direct nor
regulate the attorney’s judgment in the case being funded.”). See generally supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
78. See DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2827 & n.220; see also infra notes 206–219 (discussing
similar power and sway in the insured-insurer relationship).  But see Sebok, supra note 21, at 109
n.195 (“[B]ut in cases where a funder’s suggestions are offered gratuitously and are accepted
entirely, it seems to me that, although the funder is a cause-in-fact of the change in the litiga-
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torneys.79  And regardless of ethical rules or contractual agreements,
some ability to garner information and to control litigation decisions
will likely follow the money.80  Indeed, other scholars have claimed
that control should follow the money.81  Therefore, although this
model is labeled passive, some degree of involvement by the funder
inevitably exists in the management of the claim.
2. Active
“Active” commercial claim funding is more active than passive be-
cause the funder is not merely providing funds to ensure that the
claim can proceed but instead is providing an investment—an invest-
ment of capital and expertise.  Accordingly, the funder wants more
control.  Because of its differences, active commercial claim funding
may deserve a different name altogether, such as commercial claim
investment.  It has been referred to by the founders of BlackRobe
Capital Partners, LLC (now defunct) as “Funding 2.0.”82  This type of
funding is newer and less accepted.  A handful of companies, includ-
ing Fulbrook Capital Management, LLC, are beginning to provide this
type of funding in the United States,83 and a few companies provide
this option in Australia, where the rules regulating this field are more
lenient.84
tion’s direction, she is not a proximate cause.  The proximate cause is the funded party, who
bears the responsibility for choosing to subject their will to that of the funder.”).
79. Some (if not all) of the founders and principals of BlackRobe Capital, Fulbrook, and
Juridica hold JDs and practiced law for decades. See supra note 89.
80. See Keith N. Hylton, Toward a Regulatory Framework for Third-Party Funding of Litiga-
tion, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 527 (2014).
81. See, e.g., Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1323–24 (arguing that a funder co-owns some or part of
the claim and that the law should support transfer of the rights over litigation and control that go
with that portion of ownership).
82. John P. Coffey, Exec. Managing Dir., BlackRobe Capital Partners, LLC, Commercial
Claim Investing: A Promising New Asset Class, Presentation at the 14th Annual Klausner, Kauf-
man, Jensen & Levinson Client Conference (Mar. 20, 2012).
83. There are many hurdles to providing this type of funding on paper and likely any funder
that is doing so is being very careful in contracting, steering clear of language that implies the
funder controls the course of the litigation or settlement.  For example, the contract between
Burford and the claimant’s representatives in the Chevron-Ecuador case specifically states that
the lawyers will supervise the litigation and that the funder is not engaged in the practice of law
or other professional activities and will “not give or interefere with counsel’s giving of legal
advice.”  Treca Agreement, supra note 60, ¶ 16.2–.3.  However, as Maya Steinitz points out in a
footnote, “[t]his language . . . is probably intended to avoid a charge of the unauthorized practice
of law.”  Steinitz, supra note 39, at 473 n.61.
84. Sponsors, Fulbrook Management LLC, GLOBAL LEGAL GROUP, http://www.glgroup.co.
uk/sponsors/fulbrook-management-llc (last visited Oct. 5, 2013) (explaining that Fulbrook Capi-
tal Management LLC “offers a range of litigation support services, including patent evaluation,
electronic discovery management and legal outsourcing”).
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Essentially, in active claim funding, the funder is a claim manager
that offers an entire suite of extralegal (or nonlegal) ancillary services:
collecting documentary evidence; performing forensic accounting;
finding, assisting, and liaising with experts; creating models for ac-
counting losses, government relations, public relations, and marketing
strategy development; advising on settlement offers; and providing
general advisory services to the claim holder and the lawyers as
needed.  In addition to contributing capital, these investors partner
with the claimant and various expert advisors across disciplines (e.g.,
economists, accountants, diplomats, PR specialists, and ethicists) to
ensure that the extralegal aspects of the case are strategically
managed.
Moreover, in the active model, funders expect to have a voice in
settlement, litigation strategy techniques, and the selection of the law-
yers throughout the life of the case.85  In a recent case in Florida, the
funder had the right “to approve the filing of the lawsuit; controlled
the selection of the plaintiffs’ attorneys; recruited fact and expert wit-
nesses; received, reviewed and approved counsel’s bills; and had the
ability to veto any settlement agreements.”86
As I indicated in a prior article, an apt analogy might be to the
relationship that some venture capitalists have with the start-ups in
which they invest.87  The venture capitalist, also referred to as the gen-
eral partner (GP), pools money from passive limited partners (gener-
ally institutional investors) into a venture capitalist fund to be
85. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 18–19, 22–23; see also Sebok, supra note 21, at
111–12; id. at 109 n.196 (explaining how a funder might legally contract to get practical control
over settlement or control the theory of the case and describing terms of a contract illustrating
different types of demands a third-party funder might make); Steinitz, supra note 39, at 472
(describing the Chevron-Ecuador contract as including a provision that the lawyers are “selected
by the Claimants with the Funder’s approval.” (quoting Treca Agreement, supra note 60, ¶ 4.2)).
86. Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul, 36 So. 3d 691, 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); cf. State Bar of
Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-321 (2000) (describing a funding
agreement in which the funder could (1) control which lawyers handled the case; (2) control
which settlements were accepted or refused; (3) control whether the case was continued “under
all circumstances”; and (4) inspect any document in the litigant’s (or his attorney’s) possession,
irrespective of whether that inspection waived the attorney-client privilege).
87. See DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2831 n.240.  For a description of venture capital and over-
view of the structure of venture capital funds, see generally Fred Dotzler, What Do Venture
Capitalists Really Do, and Where Do They Learn to Do It?, J. PRIVATE EQUITY, Winter 2001, at
6; William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J.
FIN. ECON. 473 (1990).  For an argument that the economics of venture capital are similar to that
of claim funding and that claim funding could be structured similar to venture capital finance,
see generally Steinitz, supra note 39 (contending that funders should obtain control of the claim
for a price and that lawyers should listen to funders’ input); Maya Steinitz, The VC Analogy,
MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONT.: LITIG. FUNDING THEORY & PRAC., http://litigationfinancecontract.
com/the-vc-analogy (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
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invested in certain types of companies or companies at a certain stage
of development.88  The GP will sometimes have one of its members
serve as a member of the board of directors at the company in which it
invests.89  This board member makes suggestions about the develop-
ment, leadership, and management of the funded enterprise.  Alterna-
tively, the GP will have contracted for the right to approve important
business decisions.90  Essentially, the venture capitalists keep an in-
volved eye on their investment and provide noncash contributions
that are valuable to the start-up, such as managerial and monitoring
services or marketing and reputational assistance.91  Nonetheless, the
start-up often retains control of its business operations.
Active funders take a similar approach.  The funder pools money
from wealthy individuals and other investors.  Like the start-up that
continues to control and run its operation, the claim holder and the
claim holder’s preferred lawyers continue to control the legal aspects
of the case, consistent with applicable legal and ethical rules; however,
they have the benefit of a team of diverse, experienced consultants to
weigh in and provide advice.  These litigation funders, therefore, are
actively managing their funds and, at the same time, adding value to
the claim.92
88. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Ex-
perience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070–71 (2003) (explaining that these pools are generally blind
in that the institutional investor is told the strategy behind investment, but it will not know what
companies the fund will invest in and will not meddle in management of the fund).
89. Sahlman, supra note 87, at 506 (1990) (“Most agreements call for venture capitalist repre-
sentation on the company’s board of directors.  Often, the agreement calls for other mutually
acceptable people to be elected to the board.” (citation omitted)).
90. Gilson, supra note 88, at 1074.
91. See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance, Convergence of Form or Func-
tion, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 128, 142–43 (Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004); see also Christopher B. Barry et al., The Role of Venture
Capital in the Creation of Public Companies: Evidence from the Going-Public Process, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 447, 449 (1990); Vance H. Fried et al., Strategy and the Board of Directors in Venture
Capital-Backed Firms, 13 J. BUS. VENTURING 493, 494 (1998); Gilson, supra note 88, at 1071
(explaining that the GP’s principal contribution to the venture capital fund is expertise, not capi-
tal); Steinitz, supra note 39, at 479 (pointing to the provisions in the Chevron-Ecuador contract
that acknowledge the noncash contributions that a funder provides around business planning,
market opportunities, marketing, “ideas, know-how, knowledge, and research”).
92. Indeed, this is the positioning that some claim funding companies take when seeking
funds. See, e.g., Selvyn Seidel: Founder & Chairman at Fulbrook Management LLC, CORP.
LIVEWIRE, http://www.corporatelivewire.com/profile.html?id=6f946e26bbbc095620c42c4453cbf8
df7ffca1a0 (last visited July 30, 2013) (stating that Fulbrook “has a special and in some important
ways unique capacity and goal to assist in enhancing the value of the claim closer to its true
value”); Company Overview of Blackrobe Capital Partners, LLC, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=168141224
(last visited July 30, 2013) [hereinafter BlackRobe Overview] (listing BlackRobe Capital, a for-
mer claim funding company, as “offer[ing] financing and strategic partnership services to
claimholders to optimize recoveries in high-stakes business disputes.  The company also offers
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3. Acquired
Most often, in the passive and active context, the legal claims al-
ready exist and litigation is either already underway or imminent.  The
claims have been groomed by experienced and reputable lawyers and
are often litigation ready.  In the “acquired” context, however, the
cases can be unformed and may not yet have been evaluated by a
lawyer.  Here the funder might, through its own investigation, find the
claim and create the case.  Alternatively, it may be that the case al-
ready exists but the funder acquires a controlling interest in the under-
lying claim or asset.  For example, a funder might “buy” or acquire a
dormant subrogation claim or a claim held by a liquidator or trustee.93
Or, a company might purchase a patent or chose in action wherein the
company becomes the party in interest.  Or the level of control by the
funder might get to the point that the distinction between funder and
owner collapses and the contract becomes one of assignment.94  Be-
investigative, public relations, and strategic political services.”); Mr. Timothy D. Scranton: Man-
aging Director, ZOOM INFO., http://www.zoominfo.com/s/#!search/profile/person?personId=1249
914697&targetid=profile (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (providing that BlackRobe Capital “supplies
capital and works with the claimholder, the claimholder’s lawyers, and professional experts to
offer extra-legal management expertise and strategic insight in large-scale domestic and interna-
tional litigation and arbitration”); Sponsors, Fulbrook Management LLC, GLOBAL LEGAL
GROUP, supra note 84 (providing that Fulbrook Capital Management “offers a range of litigation
support services, including patent evaluation, electronic discovery management and legal out-
sourcing”); see also Langhoff, supra note 58, at 1 (“Specialist financiers like Burford have
emerged, offering users a high degree of subject-matter expertise, more efficient processes, a
better assessment of risk and, therefore, a better understanding of how to price that risk.”);
Steinitz, supra note 39, at 495 (“Although litigation finance is highly uncertain, funders may still
be able to enhance value through aggregation of claims in a diversified portfolio and through
noncash contributions including investment of human capital such as expertise, enhancing repu-
tation, and monitoring.  In this—as in the magnified information asymmetries and agency costs
characteristic of litigation funding—litigation funding is similar to venture capital.”).
93. This is not that different from what some insurance companies do.  Silver, supra note 75,
at 635 (explaining that insurers finance subrogation lawsuits that involve claim transfers and
claim-sharing).  “For example, after having damage to a policyholder’s car repaired, an automo-
bile insurer may underwrite a lawsuit against the driver thought to have caused the accident”
and “the carrier may fund the subrogation action, control it, and be the real party in interest for
much of the case, having stepped into the policyholder’s shoes by acquiring its right to sue.” Id.;
see also supra note 42.  For a discussion analogizing claim funders and claim holders to insurers
and insureds, see infra notes 206–219 and accompanying text.
94. Arguably, the claim is no longer being maintained under maintenance doctrines but rather
is being assigned.  Sebok, supra note 21, at 82, 109–10 (making similar point and arguing that
“[o]nce the maintainer assumes full control of the lawsuit, she really is an assignee and the
contract that brought her control of the lawsuit is properly a contract of assignment, not mainte-
nance”); see also Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul, 36 So. 3d 691, 693–94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (treat-
ing the funder as a “party” in applying the fee-splitting statute because the funder had the
contractual rights to approve filing, control attorney selection, review attorney bills, hire expert
witnesses, and disapprove any settlement agreements); State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on
Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-321 (2000) (opining that the extensive control by the funder
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cause the claim may not exist, the “acquired” structure raises more
issues with maintenance, champerty, and barratry95 but less ethical is-
sues with the attorney-client relationship given that the funder is the
claim holder itself.96
III. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CLAIM HOLDERS, FUNDERS, AND
LAWYERS: WILL THEY BE PROTECTED?
Although some funders claim otherwise,97 arguably some confiden-
tial information needs to be shared with claim funders at the outset in
order for them to determine whether they should fund.98  Most inves-
made the funder “in real terms, a ‘client’ with a co-equal, if not superior, decision making role”
to the claim holder receiving the funding).
95. In this situation, there is increased concern that the funder is creating litigation that would
not otherwise be brought and that, perhaps, was not even desired by the claim holder to be
brought.  Sebok supra note 21, at 66–69 (discussing the concern some courts and scholars have
with third- party funding that occurs before a case has been filed and questioning the utility of
the rules in preventing frivolous lawsuits); see also id. at 128 (defining the “theory of the in-
authentic claim” in the context of maintenance as “the enforcement of a right to redress must be
the product of the genuine desires of the party who suffered the wrong, where ‘genuine’ means
either unaided or uninfluenced by a third party”).
96. To that end, the questions around privilege and work-product doctrine dissipate.  There-
fore, this Article will not evaluate application of the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine to this model.  I mention this type of funding here, however, in order to provide a
comprehensive view of the three models that can exist.  Of course, within these models there are
variations.
97. See, e.g., ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 30 n.117 (“Our experience is that ALF
funders generally do not need access to privileged or confidential information in order to make
financing decisions.  We perform our due diligence by relying primarily on publicly-filed plead-
ings and memoranda and other non-privileged materials.  We do not seek attorney-client privi-
leged information.” (quoting Submission from Richard W. Fields, Juridica Mgmt. Ltd., to
Working Grp. on Alt. Litig. Fin., ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 69, at 68)); id. (“By
and large, consumer legal funding companies have no need to request privileged information
from attorneys regarding their clients.” (quoting Comments of Oasis Legal Fin. & Alliance for
Responsible Consumer Legal Funding, to Working Grp. on Alt. Litig., ABA Comm’n on Ethics
20/20 (Apr. 5, 2011))).  Some courts claim, without foundation, that outside funders do not need
confidential information to conduct due diligence. See, e.g., Leader Tech., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.,
719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376–77 (D. Del. 2010); Elisha E. Weiner, Price and Privilege, L.A. LAW.,
Apr. 2012, at 20, 20 (making this point and contending that in order to evaluate the strength of a
claim, financers should have access to “nondiscoverable privileged documents and informa-
tion”); Donovan, supra note 8, at 13 (reporting that the CEO of Juridica and the chief underwrit-
ing officer of Gerchen Keller Capital both claimed that they “are careful not to do anything that
would endanger attorney-client privilege”).
98. See, e.g., Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d,
931 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2006) (“[Tort plaintiff’s] attorneys also provided [the supplier] with informa-
tion about her claim to assist [the supplier] in deciding whether to advance her funds.”); see also
BEISNER ET AL., supra note 28, at 8 (“In order to evaluate a plaintiff’s claim and determine
whether and on what terms to finance the case, a litigation financing company generally will ask
to evaluate confidential, and possibly privileged, information belonging to the plaintiff.”); Lazar
Emanuel, An Overall View of the Litigation Funding Industry, N.Y. PROF. RESP. REP., Feb. 2011,
at 4 (quoting application and disclosure form provided by a consumer seeking claim funding
328 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:305
tors will naturally seek substantive information before investing in a
case.99  If the case is not already filed, potential investors likely will
want to investigate the plaintiff’s basis for filing the lawsuit and review
any inside or outside lawyer assessments of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the case.  If the case is already ongoing, the potential inves-
tors will also likely want to hear the current lawyers’ assessment of the
case and litigation strategy, including why certain motions or strate-
gies were pursued or foregone.  This information provides better un-
derwriting, scrubbing, and analysis of the merits of the case, which
leads to better understanding of risks, valuation, settlement posture,
and chances of success.100  There is also a need for continued informa-
tion and communication—even in the passive context—between the
funder and the claim holder as the claim progresses so that the funder
can monitor its investment.101  Indeed, funders include provisions in
their contracts that require claim holders or their lawyers to share in-
formation.102  Further, in both the passive and the active contexts,
from an ALF supplier); Attorney FAQs, LAWCASH, http://www.lawcash.net/html/attorney-faqs.
html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013) (“We might ask you to provide medical reports, emergency room
reports, accidents reports, expert testimony, insurance information, information about the cur-
rent status of the litigation, and any other details that would help us to make our decision.”).
99. See Richmond, supra note 21, at 674 (“[A] litigation funding company may require a client
who applies for funding to have his attorney provide the company with otherwise confidential
information that will allow the company to decide whether it should fund the case.”).
100. See Molot, supra note 31, at 423–24; see also Waye, supra note 21, at 248 (“Public policy
more strongly favours disclosure of information to the funder that may cause it to reconsider its
position than it might favour disclosure of information to an insurer that would cause the insurer
to decline to indemnify the insured. . . .  One of the most significant benefits of litigation funding
is the commercial objectivity funders bring to claim evaluation.  Such objectivity should be sup-
ported by continued encouragement of full and frank communication between funder, claim
holder and legal practitioner, even where conflicts of interest might arise.” (footnotes omitted));
Lyon, supra note 31, at 597–98 (arguing that claim valuation promotes certainty because first,
“parties would be likely to agree on the range of settlement values for the claim because their
experts would be employing a similarly sophisticated methodology and applying the same histor-
ical data to the same facts. . . .  [And] [s]econd, a system of claim valuation promotes certainty
because it allows parties to avoid the relative uncertainty of jury awards.” (emphasis omitted)).
Juridica Investments Ltd. purports that its “claim finance process brings rational, economics-
based evaluation models to commercial litigation.” Our Public Policy Statement, JURIDICA INVS.
LTD., http://www.juridicainvestments.com/about-juridica/our-public-policy-statement.aspx (last
visited Oct. 5, 2013).
101. Steinitz, supra note 39, at 482 (noting that “[c]lient or attorney communication with the
financier . . . is necessary for the financier to monitor the litigation”).  They, like venture capital-
ists, also stage investments and contract for future investments on a first right of refusal basis or
make them contingent on meeting certain preset milestones. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 88, at
1073.
102. In the funder agreement in the Chevron-Ecuador case, the contract states that the claim
holders (1) “irrevocably instruct the Nominated Lawyers to keep the Funder fully and continu-
ally informed of all material developments . . . and to provide the Funder with copies of all
material documents,” and (2) “instruct the Nominated Lawyers to provide the Funder all mate-
rial documentation and material written advice provided by the Nominated Lawyers to the
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funders create financial and case analysis documents and reports dur-
ing the due diligence process and during the life of the case.  Thus,
there are at least three types of disclosures and communications of
concern here: (1) confidential communications and documents shared
with a funder before it contracts to provide funds; (2) the contract
(and communications concerning the contract) between the funder
and claim holder;103 and (3) confidential communications and docu-
ments shared and created after a funder has provided funds.  This Ar-
ticle focuses on one main question: Will the attorney-client privilege
or work-product doctrine protect from disclosure confidential infor-
mation shared with the funder and communications between the
funder, lawyer, and claim holder before or after the execution of the
funding agreement?104
A. Attorney-Client Privilege in the Claim Funding Context
An apparent assumption is that the attorney-client privilege will not
apply or will lose its protection if confidential information is shared
between the lawyer, claim holder, and funder.  Although only one
court has upheld the waiver of the attorney-client privilege in the
claim funding context,105 scholarly articles, cases, and ethics opinions
have included warnings that information shared with claim funders
may lose its privileged status; however, these warnings are often given
without detailed explanation or careful analysis of the doctrinal land-
scape.106  Presumably, this assumption exists because the attorney-cli-
Claimants, to ‘respond to reasonable requests for material information from the Funder’ on an
ongoing basis, and to inform the Funder of any form of discontinuance of the action.”  Steinitz,
supra note 39, at 474 (quoting Treca Agreement, supra note 60, at ¶¶ 5, 13.1(a)–(d) (alteration in
original)).
103. The fact that there is a contract for claim funding is likely not protectable by either the
attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine.
104. For an overview of the corporate attorney-client privilege doctrine and work-product
doctrine, see generally Beardslee, supra note 20; Douglas R. Richmond, The Attorney-Client
Privilege and Associated Confidentiality Concerns in the Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN ST. L. REV.
381 (2005).
105. Leader Tech., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Del. 2010) (holding that the
common-interest exception did not apply and therefore the attorney-client privilege was
waived); see also infra notes 175–181 and accompanying text (discussing this case and cases ana-
lyzing the common-interest doctrine in different contexts).
106. See, e.g., ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 30 (“Such disclosures also clearly involve
potential waivers of confidentiality and privilege that require the client’s consent.”); BEISNER ET
AL., supra note 28, at 8 (claiming that privilege would be waived and that the common-interest
doctrine would not apply, and noting that “[a]ttorneys advising a client at the outset of a case
may be reluctant to provide the client full and candid advice in writing, knowing that any com-
munications could be viewed by the funder as part of its diligence, and then would be available
to the opposing party in discovery”); id. at 2 (predicting that claim funding “will require a relaxa-
tion of the rules governing attorney professional responsibility, compensation, and the attorney-
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ent privilege applies only to confidential communications between a
lawyer and a client for the primary purpose of attaining legal advice or
services (as opposed to business purposes) and because the attorney-
client privilege is waived when confidential information is shared with
third parties.107  Further, the attorney-client privilege is generally con-
strued narrowly because the belief is that privileges undermine the
truth-seeking process.108  However, as discussed below, a blanket as-
sumption that the attorney-client privilege does not apply (or will be
waived) may be a mistake—especially in the active investor situa-
tion.109  Further, commentators that have addressed the application of
the privilege generally recognize the common-interest doctrine as the
only possible exception to waiver despite the fact that there may be
other avenues to secure attorney-client privilege protection.110
client privilege”); Ronen Avraham & Abraham Wickelgren, Third-Party Litigation Funding—A
Signaling Model, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 233, 238 n.20 (“The information that must be transmitted
to the lending company often comes from the plaintiff’s attorney, which can lead to potential
issues relating to the waiver of attorney-client privilege regarding anything shared with the third
party.”); Steinitz, supra note 39, at 475 (stating without explanation that “the information shar-
ing regime structured by the Agreement would potentially create a waiver of attorney-client
privilege, work-product doctrine, and similar protections”); Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1324 (as-
suming that the attorney-client privilege is waived when the claim holder shares confidential
information with the funder). But see Richmond, supra note 21, at 675–76 (“In any event, it is
far from certain that an attorney’s disclosure of client confidences to a litigation funding com-
pany will waive the attorney-client privilege.  Logic and fairness dictate that such disclosures
retain their privileged status by virtue of the client’s and the funding company’s common interest
in the litigation.”).
107. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (explaining that there is no expectation
of confidentiality); Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 246 (1st Cir. 2002); see also RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000); 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed., 1961).
108. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (explaining that privilege doctrine is
applied when it “has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing
all rational means for ascertaining truth”); see also Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189
(1990); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); Valero Energy Corp. v. United States,
569 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815 (7th
Cir. 2007); Richmond, supra note 104, at 389 (“Courts narrowly construe the attorney-client
privilege because it limits full disclosure of the truth.”).
109. Further, the application of the attorney-client privilege varies depending on the type of
interaction that occurs between the attorney, client, and third party. See generally Edward J.
Imwinkelried & Andrew Amoroso, The Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Interac-
tions Among Clients, Attorneys, and Experts in the Age of Consultants: The Need for a More
Precise, Fundamental Analysis, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 265, 273 (2011) (segregating attorney-client-
expert interactions into (1) attorney discloses information to the expert, (2) expert provides ad-
vice and information to attorney, and (3) attorney provides advice to the client based in part on
the communications with the expert).  However, in any of these scenarios, if the communication
is based on, discloses, or may lead to the disclosure of the confidential information then the
attorney-client privilege would apply. See infra note 125.  The question is whether or not that
communication is then waived because of the presence of or sharing with the third party.
110. See, e.g., ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 34–35 (explaining that the only exceptions
are the common-interest doctrine or that the person is actually a privileged person); cf. BEISNER
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While it is true that the attorney-client privilege is waived when
communications are shared with third parties, there are three possible
exceptions.111  Specifically, the privilege is not waived when the third
party (1) is an agent of the attorney or client (often called the “agency
exception”), (2) is the functional equivalent of an employee of the
client, or (3) shares a common interest with the client (often called the
“common-interest doctrine”).  The following three subparts will ana-
lyze the applicability of these exceptions to a third-party claim funder.
1. The Agency Exception
In United States v. Kovel, the Second Circuit applied attorney-client
privilege protection to communications between an attorney, client,
and a third-party consultant accountant because “the complexities of
modern existence prevent attorneys from effectively handling clients’
affairs without the help of others.”112  The court reasoned that the
attorney-client privilege should not be waived in those instances
where the attorney, in order to provide more effective legal advice
and services, needs help from a third-party consultant.113  Many fed-
eral courts have relied on Kovel to uphold attorney-client privilege
protection for communications shared with various kinds of third par-
ties, including paralegals, secretaries, law clerks, and nontestifying ex-
perts such as patent agents, economists, accountants, and public
relations consultants.114
Many courts apply Kovel’s agency exception very narrowly, protect-
ing communications with third parties only when those third parties
ET AL., supra note 28, at 8 & 13 n.23 (stating that “[i]f the plaintiff elects to provide the informa-
tion to the financing company, any privilege protecting it likely would be waived” because the
common-interest doctrine will not apply because it requires a common legal interest).
111. It is also possible that a funder, claim holder, and fee lawyer will agree that the funder
will be a co-client.  Silver, supra note 75, at 627 (“Nothing prevents a funder, a plaintiff, and a
contingent fee lawyer from agreeing that the funder will be a co-client.  They have the same
freedom as insurers, policyholders, and defense lawyers to structure their relationship as they
wish.”).  If the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and state laws on maintenance and cham-
perty do not prevent third-party funders from being co-clients with the original claim holder, this
arrangement preserves the attorney-client privilege.
112. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
113. Id. at 922.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243–44 (2d Cir. 1989) (accountants);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 786 F.2d 3, 6 n.4 (1st Cir. 1986) (paralegals); United States v.
Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1045–46 (3d Cir. 1975) (psychiatrists); Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329,
1332 (10th Cir. 1972) (secretaries and law clerks); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144–45
(8th Cir. 1972) (accountants); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 161
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (nontestifying experts and patent agents); Golden Trade v. Lee Apparel Co.,
143 F.R.D. 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (patent agents).
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act as mere translators.115  That is, protection is only upheld when the
third parties merely interpret information that the client already has
(but cannot fully appreciate without the third parties’ help).116  Under
this approach, courts have commonly upheld privilege protection for
paralegals, secretaries, and other ministerial assistants.117  Unsurpris-
ingly, however, under this approach courts have held that the attor-
ney-client privilege is waived when confidential communications are
shared with outside consultants such as public relations consultants,
accountants, and investment bankers.118
115. See, e.g., United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139–40 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying this
narrow approach); In re G-I Holdings Inc., 218 F.R.D. 428, 434 (D.N.J. 2003) (“The Kovel court
thus carefully limited the attorney-client privilege between an accountant and a client to when
the accountant functions as a ‘translator’ between the client and the attorney.”).  Some courts
claim to apply the narrow approach but then actually apply the broader approach. See, e.g.,
Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 124 F. Supp. 2d 207, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (protecting
documents shared with an external investment banker to help the attorney draft disclosure docu-
ments because the investment banker interpreted for the client and the law firm what a reasona-
ble business person would consider “material” for disclosure purposes); Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at
243 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying a narrow approach and protecting communication with an account-
ant); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1963) (same); United States v. Schmidt,
360 F. Supp. 339, 346–48 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (same).
116. See, e.g., FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 209–12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (explaining it would
have extended Kovel to a research institute consultant hired to study “[a] company’s complex
computerized credit reporting system” had the party shown the institute was hired to put the
company’s computerized credit reporting system into a more understandable form for lawyers);
United States v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“Kovel did
not intend to extend the privilege beyond the situation in which [a professional] was interpreting
the client’s otherwise privileged communications or data to enable the attorney to understand
those communications or that client data.”); Kathleen H. McDermott & Teena-Ann V.
Sankoorikal, Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine: Potential Pitfalls of Disclo-
sure to Public Relations Firms, in MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION 2008: LEGAL STRATEGIES
AND BEST PRACTICES IN “HIGH-STAKES” CASES 271, 281–82 (Richard W. Clary ed., 2008) (ex-
plaining both the functional equivalents and agency exceptions but claiming that the Kovel ex-
ception “has been viewed as a narrow ‘translator’ or ‘interpreter’ exception”).
117. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921 (“[T]he privilege covers communications to non-lawyer employees
with a menial or ministerial responsibility that involves relating communications to an attorney.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Dabney v. Inv. Corp. of Am., 82 F.R.D. 464, 465
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (“[P]rotected subordinates would include any law student, paralegal, [or] investi-
gator . . . .”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-
Testifying Experts: Reestablishing the Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the
Work Product Protection, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 19, 25 (1990) (“All courts and commentators agree
that clerks and secretaries fall within the definition [of attorney’s agent].”).
118. See, e.g., In re G-I Holdings Inc., 218 F.R.D. at 434 (“The Kovel court thus carefully
limited the attorney-client privilege between an accountant and a client to when the accountant
functions as a ‘translator’ between the client and the attorney.”); ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F.
Supp. 2d at 1071; McDermott & Sankoorikal, supra note 116, at 281–82.
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Although there is a trend towards the narrow approach,119 many
courts adhere to a broader interpretation of Kovel.120  Those courts
have upheld attorney-client privilege protection of communications
between lawyers, clients, and third-party consultants—including pub-
lic relations consultants, tax consultants, investment bankers, and real
estate consultants—because communications facilitated, or were nec-
essary for, the provision of legal advice.121
119. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 219 F.R.D. 87, 90 (D. Md. 2003)
(“Cases decided after Kovel have narrowly interpreted this concept of derivative privilege.”);
Comm’r of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 901 N.E.2d 1185, 1198 & n.20 (Mass. 2009) (explaining
that “[a] few courts have applied the Kovel doctrine with less rigidity,” but agreeing “with the
majority of courts” that the Kovel doctrine only applies when the consultant acts as a translator);
Kim J. Gruetzmacher, Comment, Privileged Communications with Accountants: The Demise of
United States v. Kovel, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 977, 978 (2003) (“Over the past four decades, courts
have repeatedly narrowed the holding in Kovel.  As a result, there is very little protection left for
communications with accountants, and the little protection remaining is often confusing and un-
predictable.”); cf. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 33 (“Experts retained by the lawyer to
facilitate the representation, such as accountants and economists, may be considered privileged
persons if they facilitate the client-lawyer communication—in effect acting as translators of tech-
nical material.”).
120. Arguing this exception should exist and which interpretation is the better one is outside
the scope of this Article.  For a thorough analysis of the two approaches, see generally Beards-
lee, supra note 20 (arguing that the broad approach has been interpreted too broadly and that
the narrow approach has been interpreted too narrowly). Cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 117 (ana-
lyzing attorney-client privilege and work-product protection in the context of litigation and non-
testifying experts); Imwinkelried & Amoroso, supra note 109 (arguing that the attorney-client
privilege should not apply to interactions between clients, attorneys, and expert consultants, and
that “necessity” cannot be the right test); id. at 311 (contending that “[t]he application of the
legal privilege to external consultants permits the client to suppress any unfavorable opinions
and consequently encourages the client to “shop” for a favorable opinion.  Worse still, this broad
view of the privilege enables wealthy clients to monopolize the leading experts.”).  For an argu-
ment that the corporate attorney-client privilege should grow with the scope of legal practice
and should apply to nonlegal attorney communications that are intertwined with communica-
tions made to attain legal advice, see generally Gregory C. Sisk & Pamela J. Abbate, The Dy-
namic Attorney-Client Privilege, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201 (2010).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1045–46 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972) (protecting communications with accountant because
accountant was “a necessary aid to the rendering of effective legal services to the [noncorporate]
client”); Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 476–77 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
(applying protection to jury consultant expert); Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am. Inc., No.
02-Civ-7955 (DLC), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003); In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (protect-
ing communications with external PR consultants because attorneys “were not skilled at public
relations” and “need[ed] outside help” to provide legal advice, and the consultants “ha[d] a close
nexus to the attorney’s role in advocating the client’s cause before a court or other decision-
making body” (first alteration in original)); Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 98-
Civ-8520 (BSJ) (MHD), 1999 WL 1006312, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1999); H.W. Carter & Sons,
Inc. v. William Carter Co., No. 95-Civ-1274 (DC), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6578, at *6–8
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995) (privileging all communications between a PR consultant, attorney, and
client in a discovery suit related to trademark litigation and sale of branded watch); U.S. Postal
Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Golden Trade v. Lee
Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 518–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (protecting communications with patent
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For example, in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003
Directed to (A) Grand Jury Witness Firm and (B) Grand Jury Witness,
the Southern District of New York addressed the question of whether
the attorney-client privilege extends to communications between a
prospective criminal defendant, her lawyers, and public relations exec-
utives hired by the lawyers in an effort to avoid an indictment.122  This
high-profile case received a great deal of press about the investigation
and the target of the investigation.  The public relations firm was hired
to “neutralize the environment in a way that would enable prosecu-
tors and regulators to make their decisions and exercise their discre-
tion without undue influence from the negative press coverage.”123
The public relations firm communicated with the target and her law-
yers together and separately about defense strategies and other issues
in controversy.124  The court began its analysis by explaining that the
attorney-client privilege protects communications both from client to
attorney and from attorney to client.125  The court then turned to the
agents); Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer, Inc., 707 F. Supp 1429, 1446
(D. Del. 1989); Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Eglin Fed. Credit
Union v. Cantor, Fitzgerald Sec. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 414, 418 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (“If the accountant is
consulted in connection with the client’s obtaining legal advice, the privilege extends to cover
confidential documents in the accountant’s possession.  If the documents were turned over to the
accountant for reasons totally unrelated to seeking legal advice, the accountant is viewed as an
unrelated third party and the attorney-client privilege as to these formerly confidential docu-
ments is waived.” (internal citation omitted) (citing In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.
1973); Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922)); In re Tri-State Outdoor Media Grp., Inc., 283 B.R. 358, 362–63
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002) (determining that communications with financial bankruptcy advisor
should be protected but ultimately concluding that the attorney-client privilege was waived for
other reasons); see also infra note 268 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (also
addressing the work-product doctrine).
123. Id. at 323.
124. Id. at 324.
125. Id.  Generally, communications from attorney to client are covered when they constitute
legal advice or are based on or might disclose or lead to the disclosure of client confidences.
United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1048 (5th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Defazio, 899
F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir. 1990) (privileging communication from attorney to client as long as it is
legal advice or directly or indirectly reveals confidential information); In re Sealed Case, 737
F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[A]dvice prompted by the client’s disclosures may be further and
inseparably informed by other knowledge and encounters. . . .  [T]he privilege cloaks a commu-
nication from attorney to client based, in part at least, upon a confidential communication [to the
lawyer] from [the client].” (alteration in original) (quoting Brinton v. Dep’t of State, 636 F.2d
600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Ramirez, 608
F.2d 1261, 1268 n.12 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d
1065, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“[I]t is widely accepted that the privilege encompasses not only
(qualifying) communications from the client to her attorney but also communications from the
attorney to her client in the course of providing legal advice.”).  There is, however, some debate
over this. See Imwinkelried & Amoroso, supra note 109, at 268–69.  Some courts require that
confidential information actually be disclosed in order to protect the communications. See, e.g.,
United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106, 122 (2d Cir. 1970) (“[A] communication from an attor-
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Kovel agency exception and explained that in this case the lawyers
“need[ed] outside help, as they were presumably not skilled at public
relations.”126  It explained that the key inquiry was whether the attor-
neys needed this help as it related to the provision of legal advice.127
Evidently, in this case, there was immense public pressure on the reg-
ulators to prosecute the target.128  The attorneys sought the help of
PR consultants to neutralize public opinion so as to ease the pressure
on the regulators to prosecute.129  The court believed that the “ulti-
mate issue” was whether the attorneys’ actions to seek help from PR
consultants were sufficiently important enough to the provision of le-
gal services so as to justify application of the privilege.130
In analyzing this question, the court pointed out that the role of
attorneys has broadened and now includes duties beyond the court-
room.131  It explained that “in some circumstances, the advocacy of a
client’s case in the public forum will be important to the client’s ability
to achieve a fair and just result in pending or threatened litigation”
and that such advocacy cannot “prudently be conducted in disregard
of its potential legal ramifications.”132  The court held that the Kovel
agency exception to waiver applied because the “ability of lawyers to
perform some of their most fundamental client functions . . . would be
undermined seriously if lawyers were not able to engage in frank dis-
ney is . . . privileged . . . [if] it has the effect of revealing a confidential communication from the
client to the attorney.”).  For a review of federal cases privileging communications from lawyer
to client, see Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 198 F.R.D. 475, 480–82 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
126. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 326 (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. (explaining that “[t]he government in any case concedes that consultants engaged by
lawyers to advise them on matters such as whether the state of public opinion in a community
makes a change of venue desirable, whether jurors from particular backgrounds are likely to be
disposed favorably to the client, how a client should behave while testifying in order to impress
jurors favorably and other matters routinely the stuff of jury and personal communication con-
sultants come within the attorney-client privilege, as they have a close nexus to the attorney’s
role in advocating the client’s cause before a court or other decision-making body”).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 329 (characterizing the issue as “whether a lawyer’s public advocacy on behalf of
the client is a professional legal service that warrants extension of the privilege to confidential
communications between and among the client, the lawyer, and any public relations consultant
the lawyer may engage to advise on the performance of that function”).
131. Id. (“An attorney’s duties do not begin inside the courtroom door.  He or she cannot
ignore the practical implications of a legal proceeding for the client. . . .  A defense attorney may
pursue lawful strategies to obtain dismissal of an indictment or reduction of charges, including an
attempt to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the client does not deserve to be
tried.” (quoting Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991) (plurality opinion)).
132. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
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cussions of facts and strategies with the lawyers’ public relations
consultants.”133
In another case, the Eighth Circuit held that the attorney-client
privilege extended to a memo created by an accountant at the attor-
ney’s request.134  In that case, the parties were told that their tax re-
turns were being examined.135  Their attorney hired an accountant to
carry out an audit.136  After reviewing the audit, the attorney advised
the clients to file amended returns for the years in question.137  The
IRS attempted to summon the accountant’s papers, but the client re-
fused to produce them.  The district court held that the papers had to
be produced because the work was not performed under the “direct
control” of the attorney and was not “prepared to assist counsel in
giving legal advice.”138  The Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that the
privilege should attach because the accountant’s work aided the law-
yer in providing legal advice and “was an integral part of it.”139  The
court explained that the test is “whether the accountant’s services are
a necessary aid to the rendering of effective legal services to the
client.”140
As shown by these examples, these courts hold that privilege pro-
tects both the confidential information shared with the third party and
the communications between the third party and the attorney or claim
holder because the attorney needs the information from the third
party in order to provide effective legal advice to the client.141  For
133. Id.; cf. H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. v. William Carter Co., No. 95-Civ.-1274 (DC), 1995 WL
301351, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995) (holding that the attorney-client privilege was not waived
by the presence of a public relations consultant at a meeting between the defendant and its
counsel because the consultant “participated to assist the lawyers in rendering legal advice,
which included how defendant should respond to plaintiff’s lawsuit”).  Note that courts have
held that “the attorney-client privilege does not require an attorney to have either authored or
received the document at issue in order to maintain the privilege.”  High Point SARL v. Sprint
Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-CM-DJW, 2012 WL 234024, at *13 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 2012); cf. In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331 (explaining that the attor-
ney-client privilege also protected communications between the firm and the target even when
the lawyers were not present as long as the communications were for the purpose of giving or
obtaining legal advice).
134. United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144–45 (8th Cir. 1972) (concluding after application
of the privilege, however, that it had been waived by the disclosure of the protected information
to the IRS).
135. Id. at 143.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 144.
139. Id. (explaining that “the taxpayers did not consult Murphy for accounting advice.  His
decision as to whether the taxpayers should file an amended return undoubtedly involved legal
considerations which mathematical calculations alone would not provide.”).
140. Cote, 456 F.2d at 144.
141. See supra note 121.
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claim holders, therefore, there is an argument that the lawyer commu-
nicated with the funder in order to secure funding but also to assess
the viability of the case and determine how it should proceed—e.g., to
move forward or settle.  Indeed, in some situations, the lawyer and
claim holder may communicate with the funder because without the
funder’s investment, the case cannot proceed—or, if it could, it would
proceed in a very different way.  Further, there is value in the analysis
that funders provide.  Sometimes, funders spend up to three months
scrubbing and analyzing cases, and this process is not just a matter of
running financials.142  The funders are assessing the merits of the case,
the credibility of the witnesses, and the value of the evidence.  Plus,
they have top notch experienced lawyers and multidisciplinary profes-
sionals on their teams.143  That these external claim funders are often
ex-lawyers with vast litigation experience also supports this argu-
ment.144  Thus, their assessment could prove invaluable to the lawyers
and clients regardless of whether funding is ultimately extended to
finance the case.145  The argument would be that the funders helped
the lawyer provide legal advice to the client as to whether to file the
claim, proceed with trial, settle the case, or counteroffer at a certain
level.
This argument could be made in the passive context, but it has more
sway in the active context considering that the relationship is expected
to be one of consultation and not merely financing.  From the begin-
ning, a passive funder is considered to be a more hands-off credit line.
This is not the case with an active funder.  The active funder sells not
merely its capital but also its consultancy expertise.  For example,
BlackRobe Capital Partners, LLC, a former claim funding company,
claimed to offer public relations consulting along with other “strategic
political services.”146  A claim holder and lawyer that communicated
with a funder could make an argument similar to the one made by the
defense attorneys in the case described above.147  This is especially
true after the contract with the claim funder has been made and if the
contract states that it is also for the nonlegal but litigation-related ser-
142. See supra note 31.
143. See supra note 31.
144. See supra note 79.
145. See supra notes 92 and accompanying text (discussing the noncash benefits); see also
DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2828–33 (discussing the potential noncash value add of litigation
funders).  Some believe that the mere existence of a litigation finance contract signals the
strength of the merits. See Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 106, at 235 (arguing that litiga-
tion finance contracts should be admissible in court).
146. BlackRobe Overview, supra note 92.
147. Cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
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vices the funder can provide. However, this is not a slam-dunk argu-
ment by any means.  First, this argument will likely only hold sway
with those courts that apply a broad interpretation of Kovel.  It would
be very hard to argue that the narrow exception to waiver could apply.
Albeit, one could argue that financial modeling documents created by
the funder enable lawyers to understand aspects of clients’ businesses
and cases that could otherwise not be understood—in this sense, the
funder could be acting as a “translator.”148  However, this argument
likely would not be successful because a key component of the appli-
cation of the narrow interpretation of Kovel is that the third party
does not add any new information in the translation.149
Second, the privilege doctrine makes clear that the primary purpose
of the communication must be to facilitate legal advice as opposed to
determining whether the funder should provide capital or other busi-
ness advice.150  Although communications that mix business and law
can be protected,151 in this context (like in the context of in-house
148. But see, e.g., United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139–40 (2d Cir. 1999) (denying privi-
lege because the investment banker did not merely translate client communications, nor did he
enable counsel to understand aspects of the client’s own communications that could not other-
wise be appreciated).
149. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 243 (D.D.C. 1999) (denying protection
because litigation consultant “was retained for the value of his own advice, not to assist the
defendant’s attorneys in providing their legal advice”); Occidental Chem. Corp. v. OHM
Remediation Servs. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 431, 437 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting application of privi-
lege to engineering consultants in part because consultants relied on information not obtained
from client); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 162 (E.D.N.Y.
1994); see also supra notes 115–118 and accompanying text.  However, it is likely impossible for
any third-party consultant to merely translate information into a more understandable form
without adding any of her own knowledge or expertise into that translation. See Imwinkelried,
supra note 117, at 36–37 (explaining that experts “add[ ] an important increment of [their own]
knowledge to evaluate the client’s communications and other case-specific information” and that
“[t]he expert creates new information and thereby becomes an independent source of informa-
tion about the case” (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Beardslee,
supra note 20, at 761–62.
150. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954) (“When
he acts as an advisor, the attorney must give predominantly legal advice to retain his client’s
privilege of nondisclosure, not solely, or even largely, business advice.”); see also High Point
SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-CM-DJW, 2012 WL 234024, at *11 (D. Kan. Jan. 25,
2012) (“[L]egal advice must predominate for the communication to be protected.  The privilege
does not apply where the legal advice is merely incidental to business advice.”); New Jersey v.
Sprint Corp., 258 F.R.D. 421, 444 (D. Kan. 2009); Waye, supra note 21, at 248 n.105.  Of course,
the line between what is business versus legal advice is blurry at best. See Michele DeStefano
Beardslee, Taking the Business Out of Work Product, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1869, 1874–81
(2011) (discussing the “illusive distinction between business and law”); see also infra note 241
and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 240 (N.D. Cal. 1990); United States
v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950) (“[T]he privilege of nondisclosure is not lost
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counsel152) proving that primary purpose will be very contentious.  It
will be very hard to prove that documents shared with the funder were
prepared and shared in order to secure legal advice and not to further
a business transaction.153  This is especially true to those courts that
interpret Kovel’s use of the word “necessary” more narrowly.154  In-
deed, the mere involvement of a nonlawyer may signal to the court
that the purpose of the communication was not for predominantly le-
gal purposes but instead for business advice.155
Third, as I have argued in a different article, commentators’ and
judges’ stances on how this exception should be applied may mirror
their view of the proper role of the corporate attorney and what
should be included in the provision of legal advice.156  Courts appear
to be more willing to interpret the attorney-client privilege as not
waived if they have a broader view of the role of the corporate attor-
ney157—that is, if they share a view similar to the court’s in In re
County of Erie:
The complete lawyer may well promote and reinforce the legal ad-
vice given, weigh it, and lay out its ramifications by explaining: how
the advice is feasible and can be implemented; the legal downsides,
risks and costs of taking the advice or doing otherwise; what alter-
natives exist to present measures or the measures advised; what
other persons are doing or thinking about the matter; or the collat-
merely because relevant nonlegal considerations are expressly stated in a communication which
also includes legal advice.”).
152. See Beardslee, supra note 20, at 752 (explaining that it is exceptionally difficult for in-
house attorneys to prove that a communication was primarily for the purpose of legal versus
business advice because they usually play more than one role in the corporations in which they
work).
153. Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 10 C 3770, 2014 WL 67340, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6,
2014).  In Miller, the court reluctantly found that the original materials provided to the lawyers
for further submission to prospective funders were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id.
at 12.  The court pointed out that the other side had the better argument, but proceeded to the
waiver analysis nonetheless. Id.  Ultimately the court found that the attorney-client privilege
was waived when these documents were shared with the claim funders and that the common-
interest exception did not apply to prevent waiver. Id. at 12–17.
154. For example, some courts define necessary by noting that “[t]he available case law indi-
cates that the ‘necessity’ element means more than just useful and convenient, but rather re-
quires that the involvement of the third party be nearly indispensable or serve some specialized
purpose in facilitating the attorney-client communications.”  Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 08-Civ.-7508 (SAS), 2011 WL 4716334, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2011)
(quoting Nat’l Educ. Training Grp., Inc. v. Skillsoft Corp., No. M8-85 (WHP), 1999 WL 378337,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, where the third party’s
presence is merely “useful” but not “necessary,” the privilege is lost.
155. See Beardslee, supra note 20, at 753 (explaining that the involvement of an external
third-party nonlawyer “adds another layer of complexity” to making the legal-versus-business
distinction).
156. Beardslee, supra note 150, at 1889–90.
157. Id. at 1189–90, 1909–22.
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eral benefits, risks or costs in terms of expense, politics, insurance,
commerce, morals, and appearances.  So long as the predominant
purpose of the communication is legal advice, these considerations
and caveats are not other than legal advice or severable from it.158
Those that have a narrower view of the corporate attorney’s role
and the importance of mixing business with legal advice are less apt to
believe that the broader interpretation of this exception should be
adopted.  Even when a judge acknowledges that “[a]ttorneys fre-
quently give to their clients business or other advice,”159 she decides
that “[w]hen an attorney is consulted in a capacity other than as a
lawyer, as (for example) a policy advisor, media expert, business con-
sultant, banker, referee or friend, that consultation is not privi-
leged.”160  To that end, some courts decide waiver-exception questions
based on the type of consultancy the third party provides.161  Indeed,
some scholars recommend that only certain types of consultants
should be able to garner the Kovel agency exception to waiver.162
Given the distaste that many courts have for claim funding in gen-
eral,163 a court might decide that these services are not special enough
to justify extending the privilege.  In sum, it appears that in some cir-
cumstances there may be an argument for the agency exception to
cover two of the three types of communications in question.
158. In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 420 (2d Cir. 2007).
159. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1962).
160. In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 421 (citing In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1106 (D.C. Cir.
1998)).
161. Beardslee, supra note 20, at 754; see also, e.g., Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am.,
Inc., No. 02-Civ-7955 (DLC), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *7–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003)
(indicating that if the PR consultant only provided standard public relations services then the
exception would not apply); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d
321, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the Kovel exception to communications with PR firm and
distinguishing a case denying privilege to communications with a PR consultant because in that
case the PR firm provided ordinary PR advice).
162. See, e.g., Steven B. Hantler et al., Extending the Privilege to Litigation Communications
Specialists in the Age of Trial by Media, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 7, 9 (2004) (claiming that the
privilege should only cover litigation communication specialists and highlighting the skills and
tasks that make these specialists “experts” compared to regular PR consultants); Ann M. Mur-
phy, Spin Control and the High-Profile Client—Should the Attorney-Client Privilege Extend to
Communications with Public Relations Consultants?, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 545, 590–91 (2005)
(contending that the attorney-client privilege should not apply to communications with PR con-
sultants); Gruetzmacher, supra note 119, at 994 (discussing the importance of attorneys having
confidential communications with accountants in order to provide competent legal advice to
clients). See generally Richmond, supra note 104 (attempting to demonstrate how the narrow
construction of the attorney-client privilege impedes the provision of legal assistance).
163. See infra notes 341–345 and accompanying text.
2014] CLAIM FUNDERS AND CLAIM HOLDERS 341
2. The Functional Equivalent Exception
In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court provided broad
protection to lawyer communications with corporate employees, rea-
soning that lawyers need to be able to talk openly with corporate em-
ployees in order to do their job effectively.164 Upjohn has been
applied to protect communications with third-party consultants who
act as “functional equivalents” of employees of the corporation.  The
narrow interpretation of the functional equivalency would likely bar
application to active or passive third-party investors.  This is because
in determining whether the functional equivalent exception applies,
courts taking the narrow approach
look to whether the consultant had primary responsibility for a key
corporate job, [ ] whether there was a continuous and close working
relationship between the consultant and the company’s principals
on matters critical to the company’s position in litigation, [ ] and
whether the consultant is likely to possess information possessed by
no one else at the company.165
However, some courts apply the functional equivalent test in the
same manner they would apply a weak common-interest test, requir-
ing merely that the third party had information or advice that was
important for the attorney to be able to provide legal advice or ser-
vices.166  Indeed, in one extreme case, the court applied the functional
equivalent exception to protect communications between the client
and a litigation consultant who was a former employee of the oppos-
ing party specifically hired to provide information.167
Although this exception would only be available in rare instances,
one might be able to argue that the client hired the third-party inves-
tor and that the investor (depending on the nature of the relationship
and day-to-day dealings with the client) is a functional equivalent of
the client.  Consider, for example, the first hypothetical described in
Part II.  In that scenario, presumably Tiny Co. has few employees, let
164. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390–94 (1981); see also Elizabeth Chambliss,
The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721, 1726 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme
Court [in Upjohn] has endorsed broad protection of the corporate privilege . . . .”); Bufkin Alyse
King, Comment, Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Environment, 53 ALA.
L. REV. 621, 632 (2002); Brian E. Hamilton, Note, Conflict, Disparity, and Indecision: The Unset-
tled Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 629, 632–33.
165. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 08-Civ.-7508 (SAS), 2011
WL 4716334, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Exp.-Imp. Bank of
the U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper, Ltd., 232 F.R.D. 103, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
166. See, e.g., In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938–39 (8th Cir. 1994); Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp. v. Marvel Enters., No. 01-Civ.-3016 (AGS), 2002 WL 31556383, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
15, 2002).
167. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Lemay, 89 F.R.D. 410 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
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alone an internal legal department.  Tiny Co. realizes that the incen-
tives between its company and outside law firms are not aligned be-
cause it wants to minimize costs and law firms want to make money.
Tiny Co. wants more control of litigation but it does not have the legal
expertise or manpower to assert control.  Then Tiny Co. hires the
claim funder not only to fund the claim but to play this role and to
manage the claim.  That is, the company hires the claim funder to ac-
tively manage the claim (including leading internal investigations, hir-
ing outside counsel, etc.) and to provide consultation of different
types to Tiny Co. as the case proceeds.  In that scenario, the claim
funder would have information (like an internal employee would) that
is important to litigating the case and determining litigation strat-
egy.168  As such, there might be an argument (albeit a weak one) that
the claim funder is the functional equivalent to a client employee and
that the attorney-client privilege should not be considered waived.169
The functional equivalent exception is a far less viable option for
privilege protection than the agency exception.  However, the point is
that there should not be a black box assumption that the attorney-
client privilege will not apply to communications between claim
funders, lawyers, and claim holders.
3. The Common-Interest Exception
Last, there is the argument that the investor and the client share a
common interest and therefore the attorney-client privilege is not
waived.170  To be clear, the common-interest exception is not a sepa-
rate doctrine that protects communications.  As courts have pointed
out, “in order for the common interest doctrine to apply to a commu-
nication, the attorney-client privilege must exist first.”171  Instead, it is
168. Cf. Imwinkelried & Amoroso, supra note 109, at 298–99 (“[T]he dispositive question is
which natural person meaningfully associated with the corporation possesses the information
that the corporate counsel requires.  In the age of outsourcing, sometimes that person will not be
a formal employee on the payroll.  Occasionally, it will be an independent contractor who is not
technically an employee.” (footnotes omitted)).
169. For a detailed description and analysis of the functional equivalent exception to waiver of
the attorney-client privilege, see generally Beardslee, supra note 20.  Suffice it to say here, how-
ever, that some circuits have adopted the functional equivalent test, wherein “communications
between a company’s lawyers and its independent contractor merit protection if, by virtue of
assuming the functions and duties of full-time employee, the contractor is a de facto employee of
the company.” Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 2011 WL 4716334, at *2 (quoting Exp.-Imp. Bank
of the U.S., 232 F.R.D. at 113) (explaining that the Eighth Circuit has adopted this stance).
170. This is also an argument made to preclude waiver in the context of the work-product
doctrine. See infra notes 271–303 and accompanying text.
171. Sokol v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 07-Civ.-8442 (SHS) (KNF), 2008 WL 3166662, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 4, 2008); see also High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-CM-DJW, 2012 WL
234024, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 2012) (“Rather than being a separate privilege, this doctrine is an
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an exception to the general principal that communications with non-
privileged parties waive the privilege.172  Essentially, this exception
protects from disclosure confidential communications between multi-
ple parties that share a common interest in the matter.173  Courts are
quick to point out that an essential component of this exception is that
the participants have a reasonable expectation that information dis-
closed would be confidential between them.174
The main question is: What is a common interest?  Currently, this
area of law is very unsettled.175  There have been only four cases that
have addressed the common-interest doctrine in the claim funding
context—which have not made consistent findings—and only one ana-
lyzed the doctrine at any length.176
In general, when considering the doctrine, many courts require that
the parties have a common legal, rather than commercial, interest177
and that “the disclosures are made in the course of formulating a com-
mon legal strategy.”178  For example, in Leader Technologies, Inc. v.
exception to the general rule that the attorney-client privilege is waived following disclosure of
privileged materials to a third party.”).  This is also true in the work-product doctrine context.
See id. at *10; see also Marciano v. Atl. Med. Specialties, Inc., No. 08-CV-305-JTC, 2011 WL
294487, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2011) (“The common interest doctrine does not provide an
independent source of protection from disclosure; it is inapplicable to documents not otherwise
protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine.”).
172. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (D. Del. 1985); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (2000).
173. See Union Carbide Corp., 619 F. Supp. at 1047.  The common-interest doctrine is not
limited to joint defendants or even formal parties. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. b.
174. See, e.g., High Point SARL, 2012 WL 234024, at *6; In re CV Therapeutics, Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. C-03-3709 SI(EMC), 2006 WL 1699536, at *5, *7 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2006); OXY Res.
Cal. LLC v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 636–37 (Ct. App. 2004); see also Richmond,
supra note 104, at 423–24.
175. Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Del. 2010) (admitting
that the area of law is unsettled but deciding to adhere to three prior opinions standing for the
proposition that the common-interest doctrine does not apply when the party’s interest in litiga-
tion is commercial, like that of an investor); see also In re State Comm’n of Investigation Sub-
poena No. 5441, 544 A.2d 893, 896 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); LaPorta v. Gloucester Cnty.
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 774 A.2d 545, 549 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (explaining that
“[t]he boundaries of the common interest exception are not perfectly defined” in either the
attorney-client or work-product contexts).
176. See Leader Techs., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373; Memorandum Order ¶¶ 3–4, Walker Digi-
tal, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 11-309-SLR (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://scholar.
google.com/scholar_case?case=15350591429862704883&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=schol
arr; Devon It, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27,
2012) (order granting motion for protective order and to quash third-party subpoenas); Miller
UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 10 C 3770, 2014 WL 67340 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2014); see also supra
note 11 (describing holdings); LaPorta, 774 A.2d at 549.
177. See, e.g., In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
178. Sokol v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 07-Civ.-8442 (SHS)(KNF), 2008 WL 3166662, at *5, *8
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2008) (denying attorney-client privilege protection and explaining that the
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Facebook, Inc., one of the four cases to specifically address the com-
mon-interest doctrine as it relates to claim funding, the court, despite
remarking on the “need for litigation financing companies and the
truth-seeking function of litigation,” found that a litigation financier
did not share a common interest with the patentee claim holder simply
because the two shared an interest in financing the litigation.179  The
court suggested that the correct test to determine whether a common
interest exists is whether “the disclosures would not have been made
but for the sake of securing, advancing, or supplying legal representa-
tion.”180  Further, like other courts in other contexts, the court in
Leader Technologies explained that for a communication to be pro-
tected, the interests must be “identical, not similar, and be legal, not
solely commercial.”181
Courts of this view place emphasis on whether both parties are “di-
rectly involved in the claims against the defendants.”182  For example,
in Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Roes & Maw LLP, the court distin-
common-interest exception did not apply because “Sokol’s counsel engaged Livingston as a
‘consultant,’ who will provide ‘technical expertise,’ demonstrat[ing] that the purpose of the en-
gagement was to assist Sokol’s counsel with rendering legal advice to Sokol, not to formulate
legal strategy that would be common to Sokol and Livingston in their respective litigations,
which would further their common enterprise”); accord Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyon-
nais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Miller UK, 2014 WL 67340, at *12–14
(holding that the common-interest exception was not applicable because the common interest
must be legal, and explaining that “there was no legal planning with third-party funders to insure
[sic] compliance with the law. . . .  [Claim holder] was looking for money from prospective
funders, not legal advice or litigation strategies” and the funders “were interested in profit”).
179. Leader Techs. Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d at 376–77 (compelling disclosure of documents shared
with claim funding companies during discussions about potential financing).  One court, in ana-
lyzing whether there is First Amendment protection against disclosing the source of claim fund-
ing in the commercial context wherein there are allegations that funding was made for
anticompetitive reasons, indicated that it believed that the funder and the claim holder do not
share the same goals that an attorney and client share.  Conlon v. Rosa, Nos. 295907, 295932,
2004 WL 1627337, at *2 n.6 (Mass. Land Ct. July 21, 2004) (“These types of concerns do not exist
in contingency cases, where the attorney and client share the same goals and ethical safeguards
exist, nor when defendants are funded by third parties, where the goals are defensive.”).
180. Leader Techs., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (quoting In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101
F.3d at 1389).
181. Id. (quoting In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d at 1389); accord High Point SARL v.
Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-CM-DJW, 2012 WL 234024, at *7 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 2012)
(“[F]or the common interest doctrine to attach, most courts . . . insist that the two parties have in
common an interest in securing legal advice related to the same matter and that the communica-
tions be made to advance their shared interest in securing legal advice on that common matter.
The key consideration is that the nature of the interest be identical, not similar, and be legal, not
solely commercial.” (alteration in original) (quoting Sawyer v. Sw. Airlines, Nos. Civ.A.01-2385-
KHV, Civ.A.01-2386-KHV, 2002 WL 31928442, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 2002))); Corning, Inc. v.
SRU Biosystems, LLC, 223 F.R.D. 189, 190 (D. Del. 2004); Katz v. AT&T Corp., 191 F.R.D. 433,
437 (E.D. Pa. 2000); see also In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982); Nidec Corp.
v. Victor Co. of Japan, 249 F.R.D. 575, 580 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
182. Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw LLP, 251 F.R.D. 316, 327 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
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guished another case wherein the common-interest doctrine was held
to apply based on the fact that the creditor (as opposed to the claim
holder) had pursued claims on behalf of the claim holder.183  In the
case before the court, however, the claim holder (as opposed to the
creditor) brought the claim—as is the case in claim funding (except in
the acquired context).  The claim holder is still the plaintiff and brings
the claim.  Further, the court noted that the attorney did not represent
both the claim holder and the creditor—as is the case in claim funding
(except in the acquired context).  The attorney does not represent
both the claim holder and the funder.  In denying the applicability of
the common-interest exception, the court explained that “[i]f the
Court adopts Plaintiffs’ assertion, that the common-interest doctrine
applies whenever one has a financial interest in the outcome of a case,
then the doctrine would apply to privileged documents disclosed by a
trustee to any bankruptcy creditor.”184  Thus, courts holding this view
find that there is no common legal interest in the claims if the
nonrepresented party merely wants to win in the litigation to recoup
its investment.185  Under this interpretation of the common-interest
doctrine, a court would be hard pressed to find a common interest
between a funder and claim holder.
However, some courts do not require such a stringent connection.
Instead, they require that the “third party and the privilege holder are
engaged in some type of common enterprise and [that] the legal ad-
183. Id. (distinguishing Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan (Dexia IV), 231 F.R.D. 287 (N.D. Ill.
2005)).  In Dexia, the creditor and claim holder had a funding agreement stipulating that the
creditor would retain 85% of the recovery on the claims.  Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan (Dexia
II), 231 F.R.D. 261, 271 (N.D. Ill. 2004).  Further, in Dexia, lawyers were acting on behalf of both
the parties in question and so the court held that the “management companies may not assert
privilege against eachother.” Dexia IV, 231 F.R.D. at 289.
184. Grochocinski, 251 F.R.D. at 327–29 (finding documents were protected by the work-
product doctrine).
185. Id. at 327 (“Thus it appears that SC and CMGT have a joint financial interest rather than
a joint legal interest.  The only interest SC has in the litigation is that it hopes it wins so that it
can get money, not because it has an actual legal interest in any of the claims.  It is the common
legal interest, not business interest, that is central to the application of the common interest
doctrine.” (quoting Dexia IV, 231 F.R.D. at 294) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Nidec, 249 F.R.D. at 580 (explaining that a common legal interest meant anticipated joint litiga-
tion; “It was not, for instance, a communication coordinating the defense in this case.  Rather,
Defendants provided the litigation abstract in order to facilitate the TPG fund’s and other po-
tential bidders’ commercial decision whether to buy the majority share in JVC.  Thus, it was
designed to further not a joint defense in this litigation, but to further a commercial transaction
in which the parties, if anything, have opposing interests.  The litigation abstract thus would not
qualify for the common interest exception.”).
346 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:305
vice relates to the goal of that enterprise.”186  For example, in one
case, the court found that “the common legal interest binding [the
parties] was their agreement to enforce and exploit the . . . patents
through litigation.”187  As another court explained,
The common-interest rule “is not limited to parties who are per-
fectly aligned on the same side of a single litigation.”  Rather, the
parties who assert a common interest as the basis for their assertion
of privilege (where otherwise it would not exist due to the shared
communications), must simply demonstrate “actual cooperation to-
ward a common legal goal” with respect to the documents they seek
to withhold.188
Thus, these courts do not require an identical legal interest but instead
require a “substantially identical” legal interest in the subject of the
communication.189  Under this interpretation, claim funders and hold-
ers have a better chance at having the common-interest doctrine pre-
vent waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
There is more support for application of the common-interest ex-
ception in the claim funding context.  Interestingly, even courts that
have required an identical legal interest in other cases have made ex-
ceptions to this rule based on the context of the case.190  For example,
a federal district court that required identical legal interests in other
contexts has held in the context of patent law that the common legal
interest need not be identical but only “substantially identical,”191 and
that it is acceptable if some interests between the two parties are ad-
verse.192  In that case, a patent holder disclosed confidential “docu-
ments, including emails containing patent analyses and other patent-
related information . . . to affiliated companies and other prospective
186. Rembrandt Techs., L.P. v. Harris Corp., No. 07C-09-059-JRS, 2009 WL 402332, at *7
(Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2009) (quoting Fresenius Med. Care Holdings v. Roxanne Labs.,
Inc.,No. 2:05-cv-0889, 2007 WL 895059, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2007)).
187. Id.
188. Dexia II, 231 F.R.D. at 273 (quoting Cadillac Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Schiller Park,
Nos 89-C-3267, 91-C-1188, 1992 WL 58786, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 1992); Strougo v. BEA
Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
189. In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
190. High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-CM-DJW, 2012 WL 234024, at *9
(D. Kan. Jan. 25, 2012) (“Although the Court has previously required a party invoking the com-
mon interest exception to privilege waiver to show that the nature of the legal interest to be
identical, those cases were not patent cases.” (footnote omitted)).
191. Id. at *9 (“Instead, the Court will require Avaya to show a substantially identical legal
interest in the subject of the communication with the entity receiving the privileged material, as
used in the Federal Circuit’s decision . . . .” (citing In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d at
1390)).
192. Id.
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patent purchasers”193 in order to “allow the third parties to evaluate
[the claim holder’s] litigation strategy.”194  In emphasizing that the
claim holder had shared information confidentially after executing
confidentiality and common-interest agreements, the court held that
“[a]lthough [the claim holder] and the other companies had adver-
sarial interests when they were negotiating the possible transfer of the
patents, they still had a common legal interest in the validity, enforce-
ability, and potential infringement of the patents-in-suit” sufficient to
invoke the common-interest exception.195
Other courts justify applying the common-interest exception leni-
ently because they believe that courts should not be erecting procedu-
ral doctrines that impede business deals.196  For example, in Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., the Northern District of Califor-
nia denied a discovery request for an attorney opinion letter that had
been provided to a potential buyer of the claim holder’s company dur-
ing negotiations.197  It concluded that the buyer and seller had a com-
mon interest in the outcome of the patent litigation because the value
of the company would be affected by the result of the litigation.198
The court reasoned:
Legal doctrine that impedes frank communication between buyers
and sellers also sets the stage for more lawsuits, as buyers are more
likely to be unpleasantly surprised by what they receive.  By refus-
ing to find waiver in these settings courts create an environment in
which businesses can share more freely information that is relevant
to their transactions.  This policy lubricates business deals and en-
courages more openness in transactions of this nature.199
In a subsequent case, the same court explained that if the disclosed
communication helps facilitate a commercial deal between the parties,
the common-interest doctrine can apply as long as the disclosed com-
193. Id. at *6; see also id. at *9 (explaining that the claim holder argued that “although the
negotiating parties may have been ‘on opposite sides of the deal’ during the negotiations, they
shared a common interest in the patents’ validity, enforceability, and infringement” and that “at
the time of the information exchange, the negotiating parties were discussing a possible transac-
tion that would . . . result in infringement litigation”).
194. Id. at *9.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 311 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (“Unless it serves some significant interest courts should not create procedural doctrine
that restricts communication between buyers and sellers, erects barriers to business deals, and
increases the risk that prospective buyers will not have access to important information that
could play key roles in assessing the value of the business or product they are considering
buying.”).
197. Id. at 312.
198. Id. at 311.
199. Id.; accord High Point SARL, 2012 WL 234024, at *8 (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co., 115
F.R.D. at 311).
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munication helps “further a common legal strategy in connection with
the instant litigation.”200
Further, there are two cases that hold that the common-interest
doctrine applies to communications between claim holders and
funders.  For example, in Devon It, Inc. v. IBM Corp., the court found
that the common-interest doctrine applied to confidential communica-
tions shared with the commercial claim funder and the comments
made to the claim holder about those confidential communications
and related financial information.201  It reasoned that “Burford and
Devon now have a common interest in the successful outcome of the
litigation which otherwise Devon may not have been able to pursue
without the financial assistance of Burford.”202  Essentially, it applied
a very lenient interpretation of “common interest.”  In Walker Digital,
LLC v. Google, Inc., the court held that a patent commercial claim
funder had a common legal interest with the patent holder.203  Admit-
tedly, these courts do not spend a great deal of time analyzing the
doctrine or explaining their reasoning for finding the common-interest
exception applicable.204  Nevertheless, these cases open the door for
claim funders to garner attorney-client protection of documents
shared by claim funders that contain confidential litigation strategy
and information.  It could be argued that the potential claim funder
had a common interest directly related to the instant litigation be-
cause recovery of its principal and profit is directly affected by the
strategies used during litigation, which can hasten or slow judgment in
both positive and negative ways.  This argument of a shared interest in
the instant litigation is even stronger once the funder has committed
funds to the claim holder, but it may also be persuasive before a con-
tract is signed and funding is extended.205  As described above, courts
200. Nidec Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 249 F.R.D. 575, 580 (N.D. Cal. 2007).  The court
distinguished the case as having involved anticipated joint litigation between the buyer and the
seller regarding the validity of the patent.  The situation is different when the third party is
“simply considering buying a majority share of [the claim holder’s business].” Id. at 579.
201. Devon It, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27,
2012) (holding that the work-product doctrine also applied).
202. Id.
203. Memorandum Order ¶¶ 3–4, Walker Digital, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 11-309-SLR (D.
Del. Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=153505914298627
04883&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr (holding that the work-product doctrine was
also not waived).  One might label this a patent law case as opposed to a claim funder case.
However, the company involved positions itself as a claim funder of patent law disputes.  There-
fore, I include it as one of the claim funding cases that addresses the privilege doctrine.
204. Likely, if appealed, more analysis will be conducted.  However, it is not clear that an
appeal will occur given that the damage will have already been done.
205. A common-interest argument may also be stronger in the active context.  For example, in
Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., when explaining that the claim holder and funder did not
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have protected information shared with prospective buyers of
companies.
Further, a contextual analogy can be made, and those courts that
justify a broader interpretation because of the context might also do
so in the claim funding context.  For example, it appears that applica-
tion of the common-interest doctrine in the patent law context sup-
ports an argument of a common interest between a claim holder and
claim funder.  The relationship between the claim funder and claim
holder is analogous to that between a patent owner and a company
that invests in patent lawsuits in return for a percentage of any even-
tual settlement or judgment.
Additionally, some courts have held there is a common interest be-
tween the insurer and the insured.206  This lends support to the appli-
cation of the exception in the claim funding context.  First, there is a
strong analogy between claim funding agreements and insurance con-
tracts.207  The relationship between the claim holder and funder is
very similar to that between the insured and the insurer in terms of
structure, degree of control, and influence.208  Moreover, the main ar-
guments against claim funding are those that were originally made
share a common legal interest, the court emphasized that the claim holder was merely seeking
funds and not “legal advice or litigation strategies” from the claim funder.  Miller UK Ltd. v.
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 10 C 3770, 2014 WL 67340, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2014).  In the active
context, the relationship between the funder and claim holder is more involved and the claim
holder may be looking to the funder to provide its views on litigation strategies and to help
manage the lawyers and interpret the lawyers’ legal advice.
206. See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 328 (Ill. 1991)
(holding that “both insurers and insureds had a common interest either in defeating or settling
the claim against insureds in the Miller litigation”); see also Neth. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Cas., 283
F.R.D. 412, 416–18 (C.D. Ill. 2012) (citing Waste Mgmt., Inc., 579 N.E.2d 322); Alit (No. 1) Ltd.
v. Brooks Ins. Agency, No. 10-2403, 2012 WL 959332, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2012) (“[Defendant
insurer] argues that, [i]n the specific context of the insured/insurer relationship, courts in this
District have recognized that where[,] as here, counsel for an insured has been paid for by the
insurer, the common interest doctrine protects communications between those parties because
of the common interest in defeating the third-party claim against the insured.” (second and third
alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
207. See, e.g., Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1332–36 (analogizing funding agreements to insurance
contracts); Waye, supra note 21, at 235 (analogizing to insurance contracts); cf. Sebok, supra note
21, at 99–100 (considering contingency fees a form of maintenance). But see Michelle Board-
man, Insurers Defend and Third Parties Fund: A Comparison of Litigation Participation, 8 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 673 (2012) (drawing a conceptual line between litigation funding and liability
insurance).
208. See Martin, supra note 21, at 109–10 (“The same rules that protect defendants from being
poorly represented by lawyers paid by insurance companies should be able to protect plaintiffs
from having litigation funders exert pressure on their lawyers.”); see also DeStefano, supra note
1, at 2838–40. But see Miller UK Ltd., 2014 WL 67340, at *11 (pointing out that a key difference
is that a claim funder will never be paid by the claim holder for its losses and a claim funder will
“never be a plaintiff seeking indemnification from the opponent”).
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against liability coverage.209  A very similar triangular relationship ex-
ists among a liability insurance company, an insured, and the lawyer
retained by the insurance company to defend the insured.  The possi-
ble conflicts of interest that exist due to the divergent interests be-
tween the insurer and the insured raise the same questions around
lawyer’s duty of loyalty when the interests do not align.210  Moreover,
courts have held that when a lawyer is hired by an insurance company
to defend an insured, the lawyer’s duty of loyalty lies with the in-
sured.211  This holds true in the claim funding context as well given
that the lawyer only represents the claim holder.  Further, there exists
a relationship between the lawyer and the insurer much like that be-
tween the claim funder and the lawyer because the insurer pays for
legal defense and is responsible for the underlying lawsuit if the in-
sured is found liable.212  Similarly, the funder pays for the claim
holder’s litigation and is not repaid if the claim holder loses.  And as
in the claim funder context, the insurer has contractual rights to con-
trol certain aspects of the defense and settlement of the case that re-
quire cooperation between the insurer and the insured,213 much like
that between a funder and a claim holder.  Even without the contrac-
tual stipulations, the claim funder exerts some influence over litigation
strategy and settlement.  Thus, in practice in both contexts, the third-
party-paid attorney may behave as if she represents both the claim
holder and the third party.  And for this very reason (function versus
form) courts have held the common-interest doctrine to apply be-
209. See Silver, supra note 75, at 617 (arguing that the main arguments against litigation fund-
ing have also been made against liability coverage); see also Weiner, supra note 97, at 20 (con-
tending that in order to evaluate the strength of a claim, “financers should have access to . . .
nondiscoverable privileged documents and information”).
210. See generally 16 GREGORY C. SISK WITH MARK S. CADY, IOWA PRACTICE SERIES: LAW-
YER AND JUDICIAL ETHICS.
211. See, e.g., Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 87 N.W.2d 920, 923, 925 (Iowa 1958); see
also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-450, at 7 (2008) (the contrac-
tual rights of the insurer to control settlement of the case do not “undermine[ ] the insured’s
right to expect that the lawyer will abide by Rule 1.6 and withhold from the carrier information
relating to the representation that is damaging to the insured’s interests under the policy”);
Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1334 (“In certain relatively limited circumstances, insurance law im-
poses on the insurer a duty to hire independent counsel for the insured.”); Waye, supra note 21,
at 235.
212. See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 328–29 (Ill. 1991);
see also Casaccio v. Curtiss, 718 S.E.2d 506, 513 (W. Va. 2011).  The insurer may also be vicari-
ously liable in the event the insured is found liable in the lawsuit.
213. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW-
YER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1.7-6(n)(1) (2009); Thomas D. Morgan,
What Insurance Scholars Should Know About Professional Responsibility, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 1
(1997).
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tween insureds and insurers.214  According to one court, this is be-
cause “[i]t is the commonality of interests which creates the exception,
not the conduct of the litigation.”215  Essentially, regardless of form, in
function attorneys for the insured represent both parties because “in-
surers [are] ultimately liable for payment if the plaintiffs in the under-
lying action receive[ ] either a favorable verdict or settlement.”216
Courts in this camp believe that “a less flexible application of the doc-
trine effectively defeats the purpose and intent of the parties’
agreement.”217
A similar argument could be made in the claim funding context.
The funder has a relationship with the claim holder, much like the
insurer’s relationship with the insured.218  As in the insurer-insured
context, in some litigation agreements the claim holder (like the in-
sured) may agree to delegate control over claim resolution strategies.
The claim holder may also provide informed consent to the claim
funder to settle on certain or any terms.  In the claim funding context,
however, there are even more protections to the claim holder than to
the insured in the insurer-insured context.  For example, often the
claim holder still uses its choice of counsel and has more power to
contract at the outset to maintain or delegate decision-making power
without forfeiting the funding (i.e., it can still get the “insurance” in
the form of financial backing, although the amount or the level of re-
covery may differ depending on the level of control ceded).  Arguably,
those arguments are even stronger in the active funding context be-
214. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., Inc., 579 N.E.2d at 329 (explaining that it would also be against
public policy, which “require[s] encouragement of full disclosure by an insured to his insurer”);
see also id. (holding that insurers are entitled to production of the files on two grounds: (1) the
contractual agreements around cooperation and disclosure of all information in litigation, and
(2) the common-interest doctrine); id. at 327–28 (explaining that the terms of the insurance
contract required cooperation on the part of the insured in the conduct of suits and required to
“give all such information and assistance as the insurers may reasonably require” and that this
cooperation agreement is intended to protect the insurers’ interests).  In this case, the court
essentially held that the duty to cooperate was “so broad so as to operate as a waiver of the
insured’s attorney-client privilege in coverage litigation with its insurer.” Richmond, supra note
104, at 439–40 (explaining that Waste Management, Inc. is the leading case on point and that only
a few courts have adopted this position).
215. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 579 N.E.2d at 329.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See supra notes 42 and 93 and accompanying text (discussing analogy to the insured-
insurer context). But see Boardman, supra note 207, at 681–87 (arguing that the differences
between insurance and claim funding are great and describing several ways in which liability
insurance and claim funding are different, including that insurers are required to defend a claim,
that insurance contracts provide for indemnification and payment of defense costs, and that the
defendant has a contractual duty to cooperate with the insurer).  Of course, the similarities do
not exist in the prospective funder situation.
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cause there is closer alignment of interests and a stronger relationship
between the funder and the claim holder as opposed to the passive
context.219
There remain, however, three notes of caution.  First, a successful
argument for the common-interest exception may defeat an argument
for a Kovel agency exception.  As one court explained, that the claim
holder’s
counsel engaged [the third party] as a “consultant,” who will pro-
vide “technical expertise,” demonstrates that the purpose of the en-
gagement was to assist [the claim holder’s] counsel with rendering
legal advice to [the claim holder], not to formulate legal strategy
that would be common to [the claim holder] and [the third party] in
their respective litigations, which would further their common
enterprise.220
Second, in making this decision, courts also consider whether the
party took “steps to preserve the confidentiality of the materials and
[whether] counsel was involved in the exchanges.”221  These steps in-
clude external lawyers drafting agreements and parties entering into
some type of confidentiality or nondisclosure and common-interest
agreement.222  For example, in Devon, the court emphasized that
“[t]he documents turned over to Burford were done so under a Confi-
dentiality, Common Interest and NonDisclosure Agreement.  ‘Com-
mon Interest Material’ [was] specifically described in the
Agreement . . . .”223
Third, as mentioned earlier, courts admit that the area is unset-
tled.224  In sum, although applicability of the privilege is not a shoo-in,
arguably there should not exist a presumption that the attorney-client
privilege is waived, and in the active context, the arguments are even
stronger that some of these exceptions to waiver will apply.225
219. See supra Part II.C.2.
220. Sokol v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 07-Civ.-8442 (SHS) (KNF), 2008 WL 3166662, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 4, 2008) (denying attorney-client privilege protection and explaining that the common-
interest exception did not apply for this reason).
221. High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-CM-DJW, 2012 WL 234024, at *9
(D. Kan. Jan. 25, 2012).
222. Id.; see also In re CV Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-03-3709 SI(EMC), 2006 WL
1699536, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2006) (explaining that a nondisclosure agreement can also
help establish that the third party is an “agent” of the attorney, even if hired by the client if such
client “has retained certain third party experts as consultants who are held to the same, if not
higher, standard of confidentiality to which Board members and employees are held”).
223. Devon It, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27,
2012).
224. See, e.g., Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Del. 2010).
225. At least one other scholar has claimed that waiver is “far from certain” and that the
attorney-client privilege should protect disclosure of client confidences to a claim funding com-
pany.  Richmond, supra note 21, at 675–76; see also supra note 106 and 205.
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B. The Work-Product Doctrine in the Claim Funding Context
There are two pertinent questions with respect to work-product
protection applicability in the claim funder context: first, is the work
created by the funder considered work product?  And second, will
work-product protection be waived if work product of the attorney or
the claim holder’s other representatives is shared with the claim
funder?226  Generally, scholars and judges state that work-product
protection will be applicable.227  However, for reasons discussed be-
low, it is not clear that this presumption is as strong as it seems.
To date, it appears that only one other scholar has attempted to
deeply analyze whether and in what circumstances the work-product
doctrine will apply in the claim funding context.228  That said, a few
scholars have addressed the topic peripherally and claimed that there
is a strong argument that the work-product doctrine protects work
created by a third-party litigation funder.229  They claim this because
“[t]he information exchanged and the calculations generated by the
finance company are clearly created (a) for a party and (b) with litiga-
tion in mind.”230  Under this view, the financing contract between the
funder and claim holder would be protected by the work-product doc-
trine, as would the financial models and case assessments.231  In actu-
ality, the analysis may be a bit more complicated, and the application
of work-product protection may not be such a foregone conclusion.
The work-product doctrine protects from discovery tangible and in-
tangible material232 that is developed to help a client prepare for liti-
226. This question presumes that the work shared will be considered work product in the first
place.  However, work product is not necessarily protectable by the attorney-client privilege and
information protected by the attorney-client privilege may not be considered work product (for
example if is it not performed in anticipation of litigation).
227. Lyon, supra note 31, at 605 (“It seems likely that courts will ultimately find that commu-
nications with third-party litigation lenders are protected by the work product rule, but not by
attorney-client privilege.”); cf. Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 106, at 261–62 (addressing in
a footnote whether the contract between funder and claim holder is protectable under the work-
product doctrine and concluding that it likely is protectable). See generally Giesel, supra note 11
(providing a detailed analysis).
228. See supra note 12.
229. See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 31, at 605.  See generally Giesel, supra note 11.
230. Lyon, supra note 31, at 605.
231. Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 106, at 261 (remarking that it is “possible that the
funder’s evaluation of the plaintiff’s case” and the funding contract may be covered by the work-
product doctrine); see also Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 10 C 3770, 2014 WL 67340, at
*4, *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2014) (finding that the funding contract itself was not relevant to the
claims or defenses and therefore not discoverable).
232. Both intangible and tangible materials are protectable by the work-product doctrine.
FED. R. EVID. 502(g)(2) (“‘[W]ork-product protection’ means the protection that applicable law
provides for tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial.”); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511–12 (1947) (protecting intangible
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gation or some other type of adversary proceeding.233  These materials
can be “prepared by or for a representative of a party, including his or
her agent.”234  Both opinion and non-opinion work product are pro-
tected by the work-product doctrine, although protection is generally
greater for opinion than non-opinion work product.235
materials such as attorney recollection); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d
Cir. 2003) (“It is clear from Hickman that work product protection extends to both tangible and
intangible work product.” (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510–11)); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 87(1) (2000) (stating that work-product protection applies to both intangible and tangible
materials); Beardslee, supra note 150, at 1895 n.137 (explaining the reasoning behind protecting
intangible materials); Jeff A. Anderson et al., Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 760, 841 (1983) (explaining that Hickman applied protection to intangible
materials).  Interestingly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 does not exempt intangible materi-
als, largely reflecting “the fact that the underlying standard of Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of
‘books, documents, or other tangible things.’”  Claudine Pease-Wingenter, Prophetic or Mis-
guided?: The Fifth Circuit’s (Increasingly) Unpopular Approach to the Work Product Doctrine,
29 REV. LITIG. 121, 134 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).
233. This Article focuses on the how federal courts interpret the work-product doctrine.
However, some state courts apply the work-product doctrine more narrowly. See, e.g., Agovino
v. Taco Bell 5083, 639 N.Y.S.2d 111, 112–13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (only protecting work prod-
uct when it is “prepared exclusively for litigation”).  For example, some do not apply work-
product protection to materials prepared for proceedings before an administrative agency. See,
e.g., Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38, 39–40 (Tex. 1989).
234. Occidental Chem. Corp. v. OHM Remediation Servs. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 431, 434
(W.D.N.Y. 1997); accord FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); NXIVM Corp. v. O’Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 128
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[P]repared by or for a party, or by or for his representative, may be cloaked
by this doctrine as well.”); In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 221 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
235. See NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 127–28; see also Beardslee, supra note 150, at 1893
n.122 (describing the two types of work product).  Although some state courts interpret it other-
wise, see, e.g., Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 100 (D.N.J. 1990) (applying state law);
Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 678 A.2d 279, 288 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), the attorney-client
privilege is absolute. See Imwinkelried, supra note 117, at 37.  Work-product protection, how-
ever, is not absolute.  United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975); see also In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 190–91 (2d Cir. 2000); NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 127–28, 138;
Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am. Inc., No. 02-Civ.-7955 (DLC), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14586, at *10–12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003).  An opposing party can gain access to non-opinion
work product by showing a substantial need and undue hardship or prejudice. Hickman, 329
U.S. at 512 (“[T]he general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney’s course of prepa-
ration is so well recognized and so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal proce-
dure that a burden rests on the one who would invade that privacy to establish adequate reasons
to justify production through a subpoena or court order.”); see also NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at
126–27.  Some courts do not allow opinion work product to be pierceable. See, e.g., In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d at 848 (providing absolute protection to personal recollections, notes,
and memoranda related to attorney’s discussion with witnesses); Williamson v. Superior Court,
582 P.2d 126, 129 (Cal. 1978); see also Imwinkelried, supra note 117, at 21 (explaining that some
state courts “confine absolute work product protection to written material reflecting the attor-
ney’s personal mental impressions and legal theories”).  Others allow it but require a highly
persuasive showing. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d at 190–91; Haugh, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *10–13; NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 126–27.  For a review of the
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) makes clear that a lawyer
does not necessarily need to help prepare the materials in order to
garner work-product protection.236  Significantly, the rule is not
named the “attorney” work-product doctrine.  Since its adoption,
courts interpreting the rule have explained that consultants and other
agents of the attorney can create protectable work product.237  The
question is whether work created by the claim funder (such as finan-
cial and litigation analysis or other work that might be developed dur-
ing due diligence, case monitoring, or active claim management) can
be protected by the work-product doctrine.238  Specifically, courts use
two tests to determine whether work was created in anticipation of
litigation: the less popular “primary motivating purpose” test and the
more commonly applied “because of” test.239
types of work product and showing required to pierce work-product protection, see generally
Anderson et al., supra note 232.
236. In 1970, the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempted to
codify the Hickman work-product doctrine in Rule 26(b)(3). See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B)
(providing that the work-product doctrine protects “the mental impressions, conclusions, opin-
ions, or legal theories of [the] attorney or other representative concerning the litigation”); cf.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87 cmt. a (2000) (stating that
work-product protection applies to work product prepared by an attorney but acknowledging
that “[f]ederal and state discovery rules accord work-product protection to others, including per-
sonnel who assist a lawyer, and to litigation preparation of a party and the party’s representa-
tives”); Beardslee, supra note 150, at 1907.
237. See In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007); see also id. at 422 (“When a
lawyer has been asked to assess compliance with a legal obligation, the lawyer’s recommenda-
tion of a policy that complies (or better complies) with the legal obligation—or that advocates
and promotes compliance, or oversees implementation of compliance measures—is legal ad-
vice.”); Beardslee, supra note 150, at 1907; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note.
238. One scholar claims that the work-product doctrine will only apply to the claim funder if it
is “a representative of the party,” and making such a showing “would be a difficult task indeed.
Thus materials prepared by a litigation funder would appear to have no work-product protec-
tion.”  Giesel, supra note 11, at 1124.  This analysis appears to be off the mark because the
doctrine does not require that a representative of the party create the work product.  Instead,
work-product protection can be provided by representatives, consultants, or agents of the attor-
ney. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.  And this protection is not contingent on who
hires or pays for the consultant. See United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972)
(explaining that it is immaterial who hired the consultant or if the consultant had previously
provided services); see also United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961); Beardslee,
supra note 20, at 751 (making same point in the attorney-client privilege context).  In its first
rendition, the work-product doctrine extended to materials “prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion or for trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent).” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (emphasis added).
Further, protectable materials can be “prepared by or for a representative of a party, including
his or her agent.” Occidental Chem. Corp., 175 F.R.D. at 434.
239. Beardslee, supra note 150, at 1903.  The majority of federal districts apply the because of
test, including the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. See
id. at 1903 n.191 (listing cases in support of this conclusion).
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1. “Primary Motivating Purpose” Test
The primary motivating purpose test only protects material when
the “primary motivating purpose” behind the creation of the work is
to assist in pending or anticipated litigation.240  This serves to limit
work-product protection because courts are forced to decipher
whether the work was created primarily for business or legal pur-
poses—a distinction very difficult to make.241
If the court applies this narrower and less common test, then it
might find that the work developed by a litigation funder was created
primarily so that the funder could determine the merit and value of
the case to help it decide whether to provide funding (or to continue
to fund)—not to help the claim holder and lawyer further the adjudi-
cation of its claim—even if that is an additional benefit of the work.
The risk that this would be so is likely greater in the passive funding
context than in the active, because the funder in the latter context
could more likely be creating documents and conducting analyses to
help the claim holder and lawyer with some aspect of anticipated liti-
gation.  Further, a court applying the primary purpose test might even
question whether the work created by the claim holder and the lawyer
(that was later shared with the funder) was actually work product.
Consider for example, Mondis Technology, Ltd. v. LG Electronics,
Inc., a case in which it appears the court did not actually apply the
primary purpose test.242  There, the holding company sought investors
to “fund its efforts to license and litigate its various patent pro-
grams.”243  The holding company provided potential investors with
“slide presentations and other documents that contained disclosures
of [the holding company’s] licensing and litigation strategies and also
estimates of licensing and litigation revenues.”244  The first question
240. United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (“If the
primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document is not to assist in pending or
impending litigation, then a finding that the document enjoys work product immunity is not
mandated.”); see also United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1197–98 (2d Cir. 1998) (explain-
ing that some courts protect documents if they were “prepared because of expected litigation,”
but that others do so only if they were prepared “primarily or exclusively to assist in litigation,”
which is a higher standard (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. El Paso Co., 682
F.2d 530, 542–43 (5th Cir. 1982).
241. See Beardslee, supra note 150, at 1910 (making similar point about the primary motivat-
ing test); see also Beardslee, supra note 20, at 751–55 (making similar point about the law-versus-
business distinction).
242. Mondis Tech., Ltd. V. LG Elecs., Inc., Nos. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE; 2:08-CV-478-TJW,
2011 WL 1714304 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011).
243. Id. at *2 (also finding that work-product protection was not waived by sharing this mate-
rial with the potential investors).
244. Id.
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the court addressed was whether the created materials could be con-
sidered work product under the Fifth Circuit’s primary purpose
test.245  Although it held that the documents created by the corporate
client and the lawyer “with the intention of coordinating potential in-
vestors to aid in future possible litigation” were “work product,”246 it
is not clear that other courts applying the primary purpose test would
come to the same conclusion.  Another court applying the primary
purpose test may have given more weight to the fact that “[a]ll of the
documents were prepared . . . with the intention of coordinating po-
tential investors” essentially to secure continued funding of its busi-
ness, its patents, and the litigation of its patents.247  Instead of being
created primarily to assist in litigation, they were prepared primarily
for the purpose of funding the litigation.
Consider a case in the public relations context: Rattner v.
Netburn.248  After learning that the plaintiff was going to publish a
defamatory letter, the defendants met with their attorneys to seek ad-
vice on how to respond.249  Likely believing that public relations pro-
fessionals would not be able create a press release that would not
distort the truth or prevent the use of certain defenses in the future,
the attorneys drafted a public announcement and shared it with their
client confidentially.250  The court acknowledged that one of the pur-
poses of drafting the press release was to help the proponents to con-
tinue to litigate their case and that the defendants might be forced to
245. Id. at *3.  Arguably, even if the work created by the claim holder or lawyer would be
considered protected by the attorney-client privilege, but the privilege would be waived unless
one of the exceptions to waiver applied.
246. Id. (“Although the documents may not have been prepared in connection with ongoing
litigation, the documents were at a minimum created for possible future litigation.  Some docu-
ments reveal [the claim holder’s] overall litigation and licensing strategy and others provide in-
formation—such as balance sheets including licensing and litigation revenues—that show the
implementation of that strategy.  All of the documents were prepared, however, with the inten-
tion of coordinating potential investors to aid in future possible litigation.”).  This case, although
in the claim funding context, is a bit different from the typical claim funding scenarios addressed
in this Article.  Instead of attempting to secure money for an existing claim, the lawyers and
claim holders were attempting to “secur[e] funding with respect to the acquisition of the patents-
in-suit and the formation of Mondis,” which would pursue litigation in support of the patents.
Id. at *1.
247. Id. at *3.
248. Rattner v. Netburn, No. 88-Civ.-2080 (GLG), 1989 WL 223059 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989).
The district court applied the primary motivating purpose test. Id. at *6.  However, after this
case was decided, the Second Circuit adopted the because of test.  United States v. Adlman, 134
F.3d 1194, 1198–1203 (2d Cir. 1998).
249. Rattner, 1989 WL 223059, at *3.
250. See id.
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settle without a properly worded response.251  Nevertheless, the court
ultimately decided that the primary purpose of drafting the press re-
lease was “to shore up the [defendants’] political position with their
constituents.”252  While this assessment may be accurate, a different
court arguably could have determined that the primary motivating
purpose behind drafting the press release was, for example, to protect
its litigation strategy.253  The point is not to say that this assessment
was inaccurate but instead that the primary purpose test is limiting
and gives courts substantial leeway to deny work-product protec-
tion.254  Thus, under the primary purpose test, not only is the funder’s
work at potential risk, but so is the work created by the lawyer or
client for the purposes of securing the funding.
2. “Because of” Test
Under the because of test, material prepared because of existing or
expected litigation is considered work product.255  Therefore, under
this test, the following circumstances would likely warrant work-prod-
uct protection256: work created by (1) the lawyers or client to secure
funding from potential investors like that in Mondis Technology; (2)
the funder in the process of scrubbing the case and performing due
251. Id. at *6 (“[A]lthough this is surely an understandable goal, and indeed one that might
make it easier for the [defendants] to continue to spend large sums on its lawsuits, it cannot be
said that the document was for use in litigation.”).
252. Id. (finding that defendants did not meet their burden of showing that the primary moti-
vating purpose was “to assist in pending or impending litigation”).
253. See Beardslee, supra note 150, at 1912.
254. See infra notes 267–269 regarding how a court’s view of the proper confines of corporate
practice might impact how it applies work-product protection.
255. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998); see also United States v.
ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
256. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.  In most situations, the anticipation of litiga-
tion requirement will be met when claim financiers are not approached until after a claim is filed
or about to be filed.  Also, that the third-party funder created the work should not bar applica-
tion of the work-product doctrine. See supra note 238.  Although some courts require that the
third party be supervised or directed by the attorney, case law and doctrine indicate that the
work-product doctrine protects materials by nonlawyers.  Beardslee, supra note 150, at 1907–08;
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87 cmt. a (2000). See
generally supra note 238.  Further, the doctrine seems to place more importance on why the
person prepared the work than who prepares the work.  Beardslee, supra note 150, at 1907–08.
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers states that “[f]ederal and state discovery rules
accord work-product protection to others, including personnel who assist a lawyer, and to litiga-
tion preparation of a party and the party’s representatives.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87 cmt. a (“This Section defines the work-product immunity as it
applies to lawyers.”).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (26)(b) also does not state that a lawyer
even has to be involved with the preparation of the work.  Instead, it states that a “representa-
tive,” i.e., “[a] party’s attorney, consultant, surety, . . . or agent” might produce protected work
product. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A).
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diligence; and (3) the funder in the passive context to monitor its in-
vestment or in the active context to help with litigation manage-
ment.257  If the work would have been prepared regardless of
litigation, however, then it will not be protected.258  But if the antici-
pated litigation was in any way a motivating factor for preparing the
materials, then it can be protected under the because of test.259
Although the because of test lends the most support to claim
funders, there are at least three risks in relying on it.  First, although
funders could argue that the work would not be created but for the
litigation, the funders’ business is to fund; therefore, courts might find
that the ordinary business exception applies.260  That is, a court might
find that the work was created in the ordinary course of business be-
cause funders, in their ordinary course of business, generally scrub
cases to determine their merit and value and develop reports around
the financial strength of cases.  This argument is not very strong but
might have some teeth if the claim has not yet been filed at the time
the funder decides whether to fund.  Although funders could argue
that the work would not be created but for the litigation, if the funder
decides not to fund, there might not be any litigation. Therefore,
courts might find that because the funders’ business is funding litiga-
tion, the ordinary business exception applies.261  That said, some
courts recognize an exception when the ordinary course of business is
itself in anticipation of litigation.262
257. A caveat might be if the funding is being pursued before the case is really a case and
there is a question of whether the documents were disclosed in anticipation of litigation. Cf.
Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 10 C 3770, 2014 WL 67340, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2014)
(rejecting arugment that work product-protection should be applied to work “prepared in order
to permit the client to determine whether to undertake a business transaction,” and pointing out
that such an argument “does not apply here since litigation antedated the business transaction—
i.e., the funding”).
258. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195, 1204–05.
259. Id.
260. Essentially, the ordinary business exception applies if the work “would have been pre-
pared irrespective of the anticipated litigation.” Id. at 1205.  On the other hand, if the antici-
pated litigation was in any way part of the impetus for creating the work, then the work can be
protected under the because of test.  Id. at 1198.
261. Cf. Harper v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 138 F.R.D. 655, 665 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (presuming
that adjuster reports are not prepared in anticipation of litigation); Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94
F.R.D. 131, 134–35 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (holding that courts must decide on a case-by-case basis if
the insurer’s activities “shift” from the ordinary course of business to preparation for litigation,
but finding that the motivation for the report is not litigation if it predates the making of a
claim).  Often claim funding is sought after the claim is already being litigated.  Other times it is
sought as a prerequisite to file a claim.  Thus, this determination would depend on the court’s
view of the “in anticipation” requirement.  Some courts take a very narrow view. See Beardslee,
supra note 150, at 1901–03.
262. See McCullough v. Standard Pressing Machs. Co., 39 Va. Cir. 191, 195 (1996) (“Because
liability insurance, unlike first party insurance, essentially constitutes ‘litigation insurance,’ many
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Second, courts that are in districts that have adopted the because of
test263 sometimes infuse a primary purpose test into the analysis and
decide the case based on whether the attorney-client privilege is appli-
cable—that is, whether the primary purpose for the communication
was for legal advice.264  For example, when applying this exception to
work completed by public relations consultants, “some courts infuse
the ‘ordinary course of business’ analysis with a ‘primary purpose’
component, even if the court sits in a jurisdiction that has adopted the
‘because of’ test.”265
Third, courts sometimes deny work-product protection because the
work was created by nonlawyer professionals, despite the fact that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the original work-product case
make clear that materials prepared by nonlawyers are protectable.266
Essentially, some judges attempt to make a distinction between busi-
ness and law, and when the professional that is consulted is a typical
business consultant (e.g., a public relations consultant), the judge ref-
uses to apply work-product protection.267  Evidently, the judge does
so because she either views the role of the lawyer very narrowly or
believes that the business advice could not help or affect the lawyer’s
provision of legal advice or services.268  Essentially, as courts explain,
courts have held that adjuster reports prepared on behalf of liability insurers are prepared in
anticipation of litigation and constitute privileged work product.” (citation omitted) (citing
Kandel v. Tocher, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (App. Div. 1965))); see also, e.g., Weitzman v. Blazing
Pedals, Inc., 151 F.R.D. 125, 126 (D. Colo. 1993); Pete Rinaldi’s Fast Foods, Inc. v. Great Am.
Ins. Cos., 123 F.R.D. 198, 201 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Fontaine v. Sunflower Beef Carrier, Inc., 87
F.R.D. 89, 92–93 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Ashmead v. Harris, 336 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 1983); Kandel,
256 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (“[O]nce an accident has arisen there is little or nothing that the insurer or
its employees do with respect to an accident report except in contemplation and in preparation
for eventual litigation or for a settlement which may avoid the necessity of litigation.  In this
connection, therefore, it is immaterial whether attorneys have actually been assigned or em-
ployed by the insurer to represent the insured in the settlement or defense of the claim.  For
parallel reasons, it is immaterial whether the action based on the claim has been begun or not.”).
263. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198 (explaining that under the because of test, documents are pro-
tected if they were prepared because of existing or expected litigation); see also United States v.
ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (explaining that Rule
26(b)(3) does not “state that a document must have been prepared to aid in the conduct of
litigation in order to constitute work product, much less primarily or exclusively to aid in litiga-
tion.  Preparing a document ‘in anticipation of litigation’ is sufficient.” (quoting Adlman, 134
F.3d at 1198)); Beardslee, supra note 150, at 1903–04 n.191; id. at 1905–07 (describing the
broader because of test and comparing it to the primary motivating purpose test).
264. See Beardslee, supra note 150, at 1915–17, 1922–25 (making same point and describing
decisions in support of claim).
265. Id. at 1917.
266. Id. at 1913–15; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508
(1947).
267. Beardslee, supra note 150, at 1913–15 (providing examples).
268. Id. at 1914–15.
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“how far work product protection extends turns on a balancing of pol-
icy concerns rather than application of abstract logic.”269
The argument that the work created by the funder is protected by
the work-product doctrine is weaker in the passive funding context
than in the active context.  It is also weaker before funding, as op-
posed to after funding has been extended, and it is weaker before the
case has been filed.270  The argument for work-product protection in
the active context is stronger because active funders are asked to ana-
lyze cases and provide advice and consultation to the lawyer and the
claim holder on a variety of aspects of the case in order for the lawyer
to determine not just if it can proceed with litigation (by securing the
necessary funding) but whether it should proceed and how.  These are
all considerations that help the lawyer prepare for anticipated litiga-
tion and provide better legal advice to the client.
3. Is Work-Product Protection Waived When Work Product Is
Shared with Claim Funders?
This question should be an easy one to answer.  This is because the
work-product doctrine, unlike the attorney-client privilege, is de-
signed to embrace collaboration between lawyers and outsiders.
Thus, the general mantra is that work-product protection is only
waived by sharing it with a third party when such disclosure is to an
adversary or “substantially increases the opportunity for potential ad-
versaries to obtain the information.”271  Courts state that “[a] disclo-
269. United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing the primary motivat-
ing purpose test with approval but applying a “prepared primarily for use in litigation test”).
Textron may be an outlier case. See, e.g., United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 138 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (sharply disagreeing with the decision in Textron  because “a document can contain
protected work-product material even though it serves multiple purposes, so long as the pro-
tected material was prepared because of the prospect of litigation”).  However, if other courts
were to begin to apply a “primarily for use in litigation” test, arguably, this would not bode well
for finding work-product protection in the claim funding context.
270. See supra note 257.
271. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated December 18, 1981 & January 4, 1982, 561 F. Supp.
1247, 1257 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); accord United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st
Cir. 1997) (“The [attorney-client] privilege . . . is designed to protect confidentiality, so that any
disclosure outside the magic circle is inconsistent with the privilege; by contrast, work product
protection is provided against ‘adversaries,’ so only disclosing material in a way inconsistent with
keeping it from an adversary waives work product protection.”); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley &
Co., No. 08-Civ-7508 (SAS), 2011 WL 4716334, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2011) (“Rather, work
product protection is waived only when documents are used in a manner contrary to the doc-
trine’s purpose, or when disclosure substantially increases the opportunity for potential adversa-
ries to obtain the information.  Protection is thus forfeited when work product materials are
either given to an adversary or used in such a way that they may end up in the hands of an
adversary.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted)); Gutter v. E.I. Dupont de
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sure made in the pursuit of . . . trial preparation, and not inconsistent
with maintaining secrecy against opponents, should be allowed with-
out waiver of the privilege.”272  The reasoning is that
impressions and strategies are not always created in a vacuum, but,
rather are generated in cogent discourse with others, including the
clients and agents. Further, the exchange of such documents and
ideas with those whose expertise and knowledge of certain facts can
help the attorney in the assessment of any aspect of the litigation
does not invoke a waiver of the doctrine.273
Presumably, such reasoning ensures that work product (including
litigation strategies) shared with a claim funder would not lose its pro-
tection because of such disclosure.  This reasoning is applicable after a
contract has been signed and funding has been committed because a
funder would have no interest in sharing confidential information with
adversaries.274  However, such reasoning is less applicable before
funding has been secured if the claim funder decides to forego the
investment opportunity.  In that situation, the disclosure might en-
hance the possibility that the information would be disclosed to an
adversary.275
Further complicating the analysis is that some courts, in determin-
ing whether the disclosure increased the opportunity for a potential
adversary to obtain the work, analyze whether the third party shares a
common interest with the party276—despite the fact that the common-
interest doctrine is, by and large, an exception to waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege.277  Essentially, if a common interest exists be-
tween a party and third party, then the court finds that disclosure of
Nemours & Co., No. 95-CV-2152, 1998 WL 2017926, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 1998) (“While
disclosure to outside auditors may waive the attorney-client privilege, it does not waive the work
product privilege . . . .”); see also 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2024 (3d ed. 2010) (citing cases).
272. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d at 1299.
273. NXIVM Corp. v. O’Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2007).
274. See Giesel, supra note 11, at 1138.
275. See id. at 1137–38 (making similar point but arguing that a nondisclosure agreement
might solve this problem).
276. See Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 445–46 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); see also, e.g., Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d at 1297–99 (applying a common-interest analy-
sis to determine work-product protection); Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, 75 P.3d
1088, 1100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that “[t]he purpose of the common interest doctrine
is to permit persons with common interests to share privileged attorney-client and work-product
communications in order to coordinate their respective positions without destroying the privi-
lege”); D’Ippolito v. Cities Serv. Co., 39 F.R.D. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See generally Richmond,
supra note 104, at 414 (“Although developed in the context of the attorney-client privilege, the
common interest doctrine has been expanded to protect against the waiver of work product
immunity.”).
277. See supra notes 170–225 and accompanying text.
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work product to that third party would not waive work-product pro-
tection.278  This is intuitive.  If the third party shares a common inter-
est, then the third party is likely neither an adversary nor likely to
share the protected information with an adversary.279  By the same
token, if some commonality of interest does not exist with the third
party, the sharing of information may risk disclosure to adversaries.280
For example, if a company disclosed information to an accountant, the
accountant may have been required by law or other professional obli-
gations to share this information with potential adversaries.281
However, the difficulty lies in what type of “common interest” a
court requires.  When infusing a common-interest analysis into the de-
cision around work-product protection, some courts take a narrow ap-
proach as described earlier in this Article.282  Others require the third
278. See, e.g., Marciano v. Atl. Med. Specialties, Inc., No. 08-CV-305-JTC, 2011 WL 294487, at
*3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2011); In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 90-Civ.-1260 (SS), 1993 WL 561125,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1993).
279. See Medinol, Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Such
use of work product serves the parties’ litigation interests and does not ‘substantially increase[ ]
the opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain information.’” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 221 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.2001))); see also Wi-Lan
Inc. v Acer, Inc., Nos. 2:07-CV-473-TJW, 2:07-CV-474-TJW, 2010 WL 4118625, at *5 (E.D. Tex.
Oct. 18, 2010) (explaining that in another case “the court held that information shared with a
government agency having a common interest against a third party did not constitute waiver of
the work product privilege because the governmental agency was not an adversary and the dis-
closure of the information to the governmental agency did not substantially increase the likeli-
hood that an adversary would come into possession of the information” (citing Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 642 F.2d at 1290)); Giesel, supra note 11, at 1110 (“Some courts, in determining whether a
party’s disclosure has waived the work-product doctrine, go no further than the common interest
analysis.  This is perfectly logical; these courts have no need to go further in the analysis because
once a court finds a common interest, the court concludes that there has been no waiver.” (foot-
note omitted)).  This reasoning is complicated, however, by the fact that some courts find a
common interest exists even if the parties have some interests that are adverse. See supra note
192.
280. However, as courts have pointed out, although it might increase the risk of disclosure,
the absence of a common interest does not equate to an adversarial relationship. See United
States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 140–41 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Trs. of Elec. Workers
Local No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 14–15 (D.D.C. 2010)
(“The disclosure instead must be to a party who is an adversary or does not have a common
interest with the party claiming the privilege.”); Schanfield v. Sojitz Corp. of Am., 258 F.R.D.
211, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Giesel, supra note 11, at 1110.
281. Merrill Lynch & Co., 229 F.R.D. at 446.
282. See, e.g., D’Ippolito v. Cities Serv. Co., 39 F.R.D. 610, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (taking a
narrow approach and limiting protection to co-parties); Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n v.
Fields, 75 P.3d 1088, 1100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (requiring that communications “furthered legal
interests of both parties” and explaining that “[a]lthough the IRC and NDC may share a com-
mon goal of drafting a legally viable redistricting plan, they do not share a common legal inter-
est, as the IRC contends”). See generally supra notes 189–197 and accompanying text.
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party to have at least some litigation objectives in common.283  These
courts find that having “a joint business strategy that happens to in-
clude as one of its elements a concern about litigation” is not suffi-
cient.284  Their reasoning is that disclosure of work product to “a
third-party with no legal interest in the ongoing litigation[ ] increases
the risk that the documents could end up in the hands of a potential
adversary.”285  These courts would find waiver.  Others take a broader
approach.286  Those courts require only that the party and third party
share common business objectives287 or a common interest in the out-
come of the litgation.288  They reason that disclosure of information to
a third party (that is not an adversary) does not substantially increase
the risk that an adversary would be able to obtain the information.289
Indeed, “[the third party] is contractually obligated not to disclose
business information—including legal advice—concerning [the defen-
dant company] to [others].”290  Two of the four cases addressing the
work-product doctrine in the claim funding context relied on the com-
mon-interest doctrine to justify work-product protection.  One simply
stated without explanation that the two companies share a common
legal interest.291  The other peripherally explained that the two had a
common interest in the outcome of the litigation and that the claim
283. See, e.g., Marciano, 2011 WL 294487, at *4 (holding that work-product protection was
waived because the third party (although sharing a common business interest) did not “ha[ve]
any legal interest in the pending litigation with plaintiffs”); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. QIP Holders
LLC, No. 3:06-CV-01710 (VLB), 2009 WL 1668573, at *2–3 (D. Conn. June 15, 2009) (finding
the existence of a legal, rather than commercial, common interest is critical); Bank of Am., N.A.
v. Terra Nova Ins. Co., 211 F. Supp. 2d 493, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that merely working
towards a common commercial goal cannot prevent waiver).
284. Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 447 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
285. Marciano, 2011 WL 294487, at *4.
286. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(explaining that it will “not consider the strict standard of waiver in the attorney-client privilege
context . . . to be appropriate for work product cases”).
287. See In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 221 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (hold-
ing that a company and a public relations firm shared a common interest and that “[d]isclosure
of work product to a party sharing common interests is not inconsistent with the policy of privacy
protection underlying the doctrine”); see also Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1975).
288. Devon It, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27,
2012).
289. Cellco P’ship v. Nextel Commc’n, Inc., No. M8-85 (RO), Civ. A. 03-725-KAJ, 2004 WL
1542259, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2004) (finding that work-product protection was not waived
because defendant company and advertising agency had a shared common business interest).
290. Id.
291. Memorandum order ¶ 3, Walker Digital, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 11-309-SLR (D. Del.
Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15350591429862704883
&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
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holder would not have been able to litigate but for the claim funder’s
investment.292
Further, as when considered in the context of waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege,293 some courts take into account whether the
third parties signed a nondisclosure agreement (NDA).294  At least
one court decided against waiver in the claim funding context even
though the parties shared information in the early stages of the litiga-
tion.295  In that case, the court found that documents containing li-
censing and litigation strategies shared with potential third-party
commercial claim funders “do not create a waiver because they were
disclosed subject to nondisclosure agreements and thus did not sub-
stantially increase the likelihood that an adversary would come into
possession of the materials.”296  For this court, the fact that the parties
were willing to sign an NDA was a powerful defense to any suggestion
that sharing confidential information with the claim funder in the
early stages creates any meaningful risk that the information will be
shared with an adversary.  In keeping with that, one court has found
waiver of work-product protection because the claim funder did not
take protective measures such as making oral or written confidential-
ity agrements with prospective funders.297  The other two courts ap-
plying work-product protection also based their decisions in part on
the existence of an NDA and common-interest agreement between
the claim holder and funder.298  Thus it appears that courts taking this
broader view of the common-interest doctrine would likely hold that
work-product protection was not waived when work was shared be-
292. Devon It, Inc., 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1.
293. See supra note 222.
294. See, e.g., Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., Nos. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE; 2:08-CV-478-
TJW, 2011 WL 1714304, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011); Wi-Lan Inc. v. Acer, Inc., Nos: 2:07-CV-
473-TJW; 2:07-CV-474-TJW, 2010 WL 4118625, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2010) (“Additionally,
the existence of the non-disclosure agreement and the limitations on copying or removing docu-
ments from the Data Room make it clear that the disclosure of the Driessen Report to
Broadcom did not substantially increase the likelihood that an adversary would come into pos-
session of the Driessen Report or other privileged information disclosed to Broadcom in the
Data Room.”).
295. Mondis Tech., Ltd., 2011 WL 1714304, at *3.
296. Id.; see also supra notes 243–247 and accompanying text.
297. See Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 10 C 3770, 2014 WL 67340, at *16–19, *20–21
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2014) (protecting information provided to funders with whom the claim holder
had oral or written confidentiality agreements, but waiving work-product protection for those
with whom it did not).
298. Devon It, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27,
2012); Memorandum Order ¶ 3, Walker Digital, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 11-309-SLR, at *2 (D.
Del. Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15350591429862704
883&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
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tween funders, lawyers, and claim holders in the passive or active con-
text—especially if the parties signed an NDA.
However, it is also difficult to predict which approach a court will
apply, because courts do not necessarily define the term “common in-
terest” in the same way in the attorney-client privilege context as they
do in the work-product doctrine context.299  For example, in the attor-
ney-client privilege context, a court might require that there be a
shared legal and business interest in order to escape waiver of the
attorney-client privilege; however, in the work-product context, the
same court may only require a shared business interest to meet com-
mon-interest standards.
That said, at least one court has pointed out that the definition of
common interest may be tied to which of the two tests the appellate
court applies to determine whether something is work product.300  It
explained that if the appellate court has adopted the broader because
of test, “work product protection extends to documents prepared in
anticipation of litigation even if they are ‘intended to assist in the
making of a business decision influenced by the likely outcome of the
anticipated litigation.’”301  “Thus, the fact that [the defendant com-
pany] and [third-party funder] do not share a common litigation inter-
est is of no moment.”302  Indeed, these courts may not consider work-
product protection waived unless there is a “a tangible adversarial re-
lationship.”303  However, if the court applies the primary purpose test,
the definition of common interest may be interpreted more narrowly
and waiver may be found more readily.  In sum, a presumption that
the work-product doctrine will not be waived when work product is
shared with claim funders may be misplaced.
299. But see Russo v. Cabot Corp., Nos. Civ.A 01-2613, Civ.A 01-2775, Civ.A 01-2776, 2001
WL 34371702, at *2–5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2001) (applying the common-interest doctrine and the
same waiver analysis).  Additionally, some courts apply and analyze the work-product and attor-
ney-client privilege doctrine questions together. Id. at *2 n.6 (“While the cases deal with attor-
ney-client privilege and not specifically with the work product doctrine, we see no reason to treat
these principles differently for purposes of waiver.”); see also Weiner, supra note 97, at 22
(“Under California law, waiver of both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privi-
lege are analyzed together using common law waiver principles.”).
300. Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 447 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
301. Id. (quoting United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998)).
302. Id. at 447.
303. Id.
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IV. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CLAIM HOLDERS, FUNDERS, AND
LAWYERS: SHOULD THEY BE PROTECTED?
The preceding analysis fills a gap in the literature and law by pro-
viding an in-depth analysis of the potential applicability of the attor-
ney-client privilege and work-product doctrine in the claim funding
context.  It demonstrates that given the way both of the doctrines have
been interpreted, presumptions that either will or will not apply are
misplaced.  That said, it is clear from the foregoing analysis that there
exist circumstances in which the doctrine can be interpreted to protect
communications between and material created by claim holders, law-
yers, and claim funders.  It is not clear, however, that just because the
doctrine can enable such protection, that it should be applied to do so.
Instead of attempting to answer this normative inquiry by analyzing
the history and purpose behind the two respective protective doc-
trines,304 this Part considers whether protecting these interactions
from disclosure exacerbates the common problems associated with
claim funding and explores the potential benefits that might flow from
extending protection thereto.305  Although there may be other argu-
ments against claim funding, two common problems are identified by
commentators and courts: (1) the claim funding relationship threatens
the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship in that claim funders
might try to manipulate and control the lawyer, litigation, and claim
holder; and (2) claim funding increases litigation of nonmeritorious
claims or prolongs settlement.306
304. To review arguments in favor of applying the attorney-client privilege and work-product
protections to interactions with third parties in certain situations, see generally Beardslee, supra
note 20; Beardslee, supra note 150.
305. That said, as will be discussed, these benefits are related to the purposes behind the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrines.
306. Richmond, supra note 21, at 651–52 (identifying these as the common problems); see
also, e.g., Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 2003) (same
but addressing consumer context); Oliver v. Bd. of Governors, Ky. Bar Ass’n, 779 S.W.2d 212,
215 (Ky. 1989); Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386, 487
(Austl.) (remarking on the issue of control); ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 1 nn.1–4
(same); BEISNER ET AL., supra note 28, at 6–7 (identifying plaintiff’s control as a key issue);
Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 106, at 235 (making point about control and accuracy, and
arguing that funding contracts should be admitted in courts and that doing so will improve accu-
racy and decrease rates charged by funders); Giesel, supra note 11, at 1095 (listing attorney
independence and conflict of interest as two of the main problems associated with claim fund-
ing); Paul H. Rubin, Third-Party Financing of Litigation, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 673 (2011) (arguing
that claim funding will increase litigation in a way that will be harmful).
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A. Independence of the Lawyer and the Funder’s Level of Control
Fearing that lawyers will be negatively influenced by nonlawyers,
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 prohibits lawyers and
nonlawyers from sharing legal fees and from forming a partnership “if
any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of
law.”307  As a result, outside investment in, or ownership of, law firms
is prohibited in the United States, along with multidisciplinary part-
nerships between lawyers and nonlawyers.
Opponents of third-party claim funding argue that funding agree-
ments between the claim holder and funder interfere with a lawyer’s
ability to provide independent legal advice as required under Model
Rule 5.4(c), and that the lawyer’s duty of loyalty might become subor-
dinated to the claim funder, creating a conflict of interest.308  Indeed,
the ABA fears that attorneys will lose their ability to provide indepen-
dent judgment regardless of the way the funding contracts are struc-
tured and regardless of the funder’s level of involvement.309  It
believes that issues will arise around “who actually owns the claim,
who controls the lawsuit, the role (if any) of the [funder] participating
in significant decision-making during the litigation, and how to resolve
conflicts between the client’s directive, the [funder’s] financial expec-
tations, and the lawyer’s assessment of the client’s best interests.”310
Further, opponents argue that “litigation-financing arrangements un-
dercut the plaintiff’s control over his or her own claim because inves-
tors inherently desire to protect their investment and will therefore
seek to exert control over strategic decisions in the lawsuit.”311
Although it would be hard to prove that this issue dissipates by pro-
tecting interactions with and work created by claim funders, it (at the
very least) takes away one of the motivations for funders to acquire
the claim outright or seek to become co-clients to the litigation—both
of which would enable protection of the interactions in question.312  In
both of these scenarios, as either the “new” claim owner or the co-
client of the claim holder, funders would gain a great deal of control
307. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)–(b) (2013).
308. See Oliver, 779 S.W.2d at 215 (“[A]n attorney’s primary loyalty will, as a practical matter,
rest with the person or entity who pays him.”).
309. See, e.g., ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 26 (making this claim as it relates to
requirements for consent of the funder to settle).
310. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, White Paper on Alternative Litigation Financing 26 (Oct.
19, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/
20111019_draft_alf_white_paper_posting.authcheckdam.pdf (earlier draft of ABA WHITE PA-
PER, supra note 1).
311. BEISNER ET AL., supra note 28, at 7.
312. See Silver, supra note 75, at 636–638 (discussing this as a possibility).
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and influence over the claim holder and management of the litiga-
tion.313  Further, in both of these scenarios, the risk of affecting the
lawyer’s independent judgment with respect to the “real” or “origi-
nal” claim holder may increase.  This is because the claim holder is no
longer the only client or, in the claim-acquisition scenario, even the
“claim holder.”  Thus, it seems that by not protecting communications,
incentives to acquire the claim or convince the claim holder to be a co-
client with the claim funder increase—thereby enlarging the risk that
the lawyer will not be protecting the claim holder’s interest and that
the funder will be able to have significant control over litigating the
claim.  Further, if the claim funder acquires the claim outright, some
of the noncash benefits described above might not accrue since the
original claim holder’s voice may be squashed.314
B. Nonmeritorious Claims and Prolonged Settlement
Opponents to claim funding commonly argue that it increases the
litigation of nonmeritorious claims and prolongs settlement.315  How-
ever, withholding privilege and work-product protection may actually
contribute to this risk.  As others have argued, claim holders and their
lawyers may be less apt to share materials and confidential informa-
tion with claim funders if doing so will destroy the potential for pro-
tection against disclosure by either the attorney-client privilege or
work-product doctrine.316  Claim funders, as well, will be less apt to
ask for these materials because waiver could prove harmful to the
value of the litigation that they are considering investing in (or have
already invested in).317  This means less information will be shared
and therefore less information will form the basis for funding.  On the
flip side, proponents of claim funding have claimed that it has the po-
tential to increase the pursuit of meritorious claims and settlement on
the merits.318  If this is true, this benefit may be enhanced by a doc-
313. Id. at 630 (“When funders are co-clients, as they may be but rarely are, plaintiffs’ attor-
neys may take guidance from the law governing co-client relationships, which regulates, among
other things, whether confidential information may be shared.”).
314. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (discussing the noncash benefits); infra
Part IV.C (discussing the potential benefits to enhancing privilege protection); see also DeStef-
ano, supra note 1, at 2828–30 (discussing the value add of claim funders and their potential
influence on litigation, claim management, and claim finance); infra note 320 and accompanying
text.
315. See, e.g., Beisner Letter, supra note 40, at 138.
316. E.g., Giesel, supra note 11, at 1086.
317. Id.
318. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 28, at 73 (making this contention related to settlement based
on the fact that weaker parties that cannot bear the costs settle lower because of the risk);
DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2833 (“Claim funders can provide information to the marketplace
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trine that more definitively provides protection.  This is because
funders will have more information before investing and more infor-
mation when negotiating the levels at which it is willing to let the
claim holder settle.319
One of the potential added values of having a third-party claim
funder involved is that it can provide a monitoring function between
the lawyer’s and the claim holder’s diverging interests.320  This value
add is enhanced when there is less information asymmetry.321  As an-
other scholar pointed out, “a lack of such communication creates in-
formation asymmetries between the attorney and the funder and
lowers the funder’s ability to supervise the attorney’s work,” thereby
significantly reducing the potential to have an “agents-watching-
agents” effect, namely the potential cross-monitoring of the lawyers
about claim value and resolution statistics that will enhance transparency and likely lead to more
and earlier settlements.”); Giesel, supra note 11, at 1084 (“[Claim funding] provides access to the
playing field and also ensures that the teams show up at the field with the same equipment.”); see
also Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386, 468 (Austl.) (ex-
plaining that claim funding contracts improve access to justice because “[a] litigation funder . . .
does not invent the rights.  It merely organises those asserting such rights so that they can secure
access to a court of justice that will rule on their entitlements one way or the other, according to
law.”); id. at 442 (emphasizing that “the alternative is that very many persons . . . are unable to
recover upon those claims in accordance with their legal rights”); Domson Pty Ltd. v Zhu [2005]
NSWSC 1070 ¶ 78 (Austl.) (“It sits ill in the mouth of [the plaintiff] to submit that the agreement
could have given rise to an abuse of process” since “[t]he funding arrangement . . . assisted [the
plaintiff] in ultimately establishing a meritorious claim.”).
319. Similar benefits have been purported to accrue from aggregate litigation (and similar
issues with conflicts of interest). See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGRE-
GATE LITIG. § 1.05 (2010).  But see Nancy J. Moore, The Absence of Legal Ethics in the ALI’s
Principals of the Law of Aggregate Litigation: A Missed Opportunity—and More, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 717, 719 (2011) (“[T]he Principles’ failure to address ethical rules governing
communication and conflicts of interest outside the context of aggregate settlements makes it
likely that mass tort lawyers will continue to treat their clients as if they were absent members of
a class, without the protections afforded a class.”); Nancy J. Moore, The American Law Insti-
tute’s Draft Proposal to Bypass the Aggregate Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort Clients Need (or
Want) Group Decision Making?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 396 (2008).
320. DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2829–30; cf. Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1276, 1322–25 (con-
tending that funders “provide monitoring services” but that a “fragmentation of the triangular
attorney-client-funder relationship,” can reduce the possibility of having “agents-watching-
agents”).  As others have pointed out, “in the lawyer-client relationship it is assumed that the
rational self-interested client’s preference will be to maximize claim value whereas the rational
self-interested lawyer’s interest will be to maximize fees and to minimize effort.”  Waye, supra
note 21, at 229.  Then again, the funder and claim holder might also have divergent interests. See
DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2830 n.231.
321. Steinitz, supra note 39, at 516 (“[T]he more inclusive the attorney-client arrangement is
of the funder—for example, if the client authorizes certain types of information to be divulged to
the funder either in the retention agreement or ad hoc during the course of the representation—
the more all parties can enjoy enhanced efficiency generated by the agents-watching-agents
effect.”).
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and funders.322  Although this enhanced monitoring function may not
prevent a funder from prolonging settlement, it could help prevent a
contingency fee lawyer from doing so or from creating a situation that
invariably prolonged settlement from an efficiency standpoint.
C. Value Add
As argued elsewhere,323 claim funders could be a value add.  They
could add to legal case management by (1) increasing our understand-
ing of the value of the claim, and (2) serving a financial-monitoring
function.324  They could also be a source of innovation for legal ser-
vices by providing a different type of expertise and consultancy in liti-
gation strategy.325  This value will likely only be enhanced by
increased access to information before and after investing.326  As an-
other scholar has pointed out, “The more lawmakers protect attorney
and/or client communication with the funder under such doctrines as
the common-interest doctrine, the more clients and others will
benefit.”327
322. Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1324–25, 1325 n.200; see also Bernard S. Black, Agents Watch-
ing Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 850 (1992) (iden-
tifying the concept of “[a]gents [w]atching [a]gents”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance:
Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 342 (2010) (providing examples in
which attorneys and funders have counterbalancing self-interests).
323. See DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2830 (contending that there are general benefits to hav-
ing claim funders involved in the claim such as added value services, expertise, and potential for
innovation, along with specific benefits to claim funders’ involvement in claims such as “(1) an
increased understanding of the value of the claim; (2) optimized settlement levels; (3) financial
monitoring that decreases shirking and increases efficiency; (4) better alignment between out-of-
pocket expenditures and the value of the claim; (5) innovation in billing structure; and (6) in-
creased transparency on all financial aspects of claim management”); see also Steinitz, supra note
39, at 498 (arguing that increasing communication and the level of control litigation funders have
might enable litigation funders to provide value by assisting in case development, providing sub-
ject matter expertise, and monitoring).  “It is obviously in the self-interest of the entrepreneur or
plaintiff to overstate the quality and likely outcome of the company or of the litigation.” Id. at
505; cf. id. at 506 (arguing for staged investing and explaining that “[t]he information asymmetry
is even more pronounced in the litigation funding context than in the VC context because of the
limitations on communication set by the attorney-client privilege and because of the value-di-
minishing effect that any disclosure of communication between the attorney and the client to the
funder would have if privilege is not extended”).
324. DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2830.
325. See DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2793 (discussing the value of collaboration between mul-
tidisciplinary and diverse groups of people); see also Fried et al., supra note 91, at 493 (noting
that “[o]ne of the most significant value-added activities of the venture capitalist is involvement
with strategy”); Steinitz supra note 39, at 516–17.
326. This presumes that confidential information will not be shared to the same extent if the
doctrine does not provide protection.
327. Steinitz, supra note 39, at 516–17.
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V. PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS
The preceding Part attempted to demonstrate that the common
problems associated with commercial claim funding would not neces-
sarily be exacerbated by protecting interactions between claim
funders, claim holders, and lawyers.  To the contrary, these problems
might be lessened by doing so.  This conclusion, along with the conclu-
sion that both the attorney-client privilege and work-product doc-
trines can be interpreted to protect these interactions, leads to the
recommendations in this Part.  To that end, the following subparts
provide a preliminary doctrinal and practical recommendation.
A. A Doctrinal Recommendation
First, I recommend that courts interpret the common-interest ex-
ception to apply to the relationship between claim funders and claim
holders.  Claim holders and claim funders do not share only a com-
mon commercial interest.  Instead, their common interest is a combi-
nation of shared legal and business interests.328  Courts have found a
common interest in other contexts when this is the case.329  Further,
courts have applied a more lenient test in certain contexts, such as the
patent context.330  Given the similarities between investing in a claim
and investing in patent prosecution, the claim funding context may be
an apt one for which to recognize an exception.  This would ensure
that the common-interest doctrine does not apply to all situations in
which the party has a financial interest in the outcome of a case (e.g.,
to privileged documents disclosed by a trustee to a creditor in a bank-
ruptcy dispute331).  Further, given the amount of similarities between
the relationship between claim holders and claim funders and insureds
and insurers, finding a common interest in this context is not outside
the scope of the doctrine.
Specifically, therefore, I recommend that for commercial claim
funders, courts adopt the test set forth by the Northern District of
California in Nidec Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan: If the disclosed com-
munication helps facilitate a commercial deal between the parties, the
common-interest doctrine can apply as long as the disclosed communi-
cation helps “further a common legal strategy in connection with the
instant litigation.”332  This test is not as lenient as that applied by
328. See supra Part III.A.3.
329. See supra Part III.A.3.
330. See supra Part III.A.3.
331. See Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Roes & Maw LLP, 251 F.R.D. 316, 327–29 (N.D. Ill.
2008) (finding documents were protected by the work-product doctrine).
332. Nidec Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 249 F.R.D. 575, 579–80 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
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courts that only require “a common legal goal with respect to the doc-
uments they seek to withhold.”333  It is also, however, not as narrow as
those that require common identical legal interests.334  Further, it
keeps with the purposes of the common-interest doctrine.  As one
court explained, “The purpose of the common interest doctrine is to
‘foster communication’ between parties that share a common interest
and to ‘protect the confidentiality of communications . . . where a joint
. . . effort or strategy has been decided upon or undertaken by the
parties and their respective counsel.’”335
From a practical standpoint, applying this interpretation of the com-
mon-interest doctrine will ensure that both the attorney-client privi-
lege and the work-product doctrine are available for protection.  This
is important because they provide different levels of protection, and in
different situations.336  This recommendation bridges that gap because
the common-interest exception can be used in analyzing either doc-
trine.  Thus, under this interpretation, communications with funders
that further informed decisions—even before a court might find that
litigation was anticipated—can be protected under the attorney-client
privilege (applying this new common-interest exception) when they
might not be under work-product protection.  And communications
after funding (e.g., where the funder is providing expertise and consul-
tation in addition to evaluating whether to provide more funds) can be
protected under the work-product doctrine, given that courts utilize a
common-interest analysis as a short cut to determining work-product
protection.  This recommendation, combined with an appropriate
level of regulation and transparency around the control of and recov-
ery by the funder, could enable the benefits of commercial claim fund-
ing to accrue without aggrandizing the potential problems.337
333. Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan (Dexia II), 231 F.R.D. 268, 273 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted); cf. In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(requiring a “substantially identical” legal interest).
334. See supra Part III.A.
335. Dexia II, 231 F.R.D. at 273 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Evans, 113
F.3d 1457, 1467 (7th Cir. 1997)).
336. See supra note 235 (making point that the attorney-client privilege is absolute while the
work-product doctrine can be pierced).  Also, there may be situations where a potential investor
will be approached before a case has started and before a court might determine that it was “in
anticipation of litigation” as required by the work-product doctrine. See Beardslee, supra note
150, at 1900–03 (exploring how courts provide a narrow interpretation of “in anticipation of
litigation”).
337. See Martin, supra note 21, at 115 (recommending regulating third-party funding so that
there is more transparency); see also DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2829–45 (arguing that with the
right level of regulation, the inherent benefits of claim funding may outweigh the risks).  Evi-
dently, in three state legislatures (Indiana, Oklahoma, and Mississippi), legislation to regulate
claim funding was introduced or is pending.  S.B. 378, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind.
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B. Practical Recommendations
On a practical level, I recommend that claim funders, claim holders,
and lawyers (1) sign nondisclosure and common-interest agreements,
and (2) proceed cautiously in contract negotiations that set up rela-
tionship boundaries and communication flow protocol.  I make this
recommendation for a few reasons.
First, the current doctrine providing exceptions to waiver of the at-
torney-client privilege and work-product protection is in flux.338  Sec-
ond, the very few cases that have addressed the claim funding context
do not necessarily lend a great deal of support to the argument that
interactions between, and documents created and shared by, claim
funders, claim holders, and lawyers will be protected by either the at-
torney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine.  And the few
cases that do indicate that having an NDA can be helpful.339
Third, although in some circumstances having the funder take a
more active approach can provide more support for attorney-client
and work-product protection (and perhaps the value that funding can
bring), it can also increase the chances of a contract being held void as
against public policy.  This is because courts are reluctant to uphold
contracts that enable too much control or influence by the claim
funder over claim strategy.340
Fourth, there has been evidence of public policy concerns in schol-
arship, articles in the popular media, case law, and ethics opinions on
claim funding.  As W. Bradley Wendel points out, there exists “a sen-
timent that there is something fishy, even distasteful, about [alterna-
tive litigation funding].”341  For example, even in states where
champerty and maintenance do not bar claim funding, courts express
concern and reluctance to uphold funding agreements.342  They inti-
2013); H.B. 503, 128th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2013) (bill died in committee); S.B. 2378, 128th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2013) (bill died in committee); S.B. 1016, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2013).
A 2010 Delaware House Bill passed out of committee, but went no further.  H.B. 422, 145th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2010).
338. See supra Part III.
339. See supra notes 222–223, 294–296, and accompanying text.
340. See, e.g., Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 104 (Tex. App.
2006); see also DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2825–26; supra Part III; supra note 39 and accompa-
nying text.
341. Wendel, supra note 30, at 503 (exploring the historical distaste of the commodification of
litigation and arguing that this distaste applies to claim funding but making the point that the
“ick-factor” objections should not be taken seriously); cf. Richmond, supra note 21, at 651 (ex-
plaining that “[t]he emergence of litigation funding as a new financial services industry has been
marked by judicial distrust” because of concerns about lawyers’ independent judgment and
funder control over plaintiff).
342. See DeStefano, supra note 1, at 2824–25.
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mate that claim funding—in general—is inappropriate and displeas-
ing.343  Further, although claim funding is not necessarily barred by
state law (in states where champerty and maintenance have been
abolished), the problems associated with commercial claim funding
are the problems commonly used by the bar to prevent influence by
nonlawyers on lawyers and protect the sanctity of the relationship be-
tween lawyers and their clients.  These common problems include: the
risk to lawyer independence, the unauthorized practice of law, the po-
tential threat to the reputation of the legal profession, and lawyers’
supposed monopoly of the legal services marketplace.344  Thus, it is
not unfathomable that the courts’ general distaste for claim funding
and appetite for keeping nonlawyer influence to a minimum will seep
into their analysis of whether to apply the attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection in this context.345
VI. CONCLUSION
Commercial claim funding is a growing industry in the United
States.  Both before deciding to invest (to analyze the strength of the
claim) and during the course of the financial relationship (to manage
the investment), funders may request confidential information about
the claim or the litigation strategy, and may work and communicate
with claim holders and their lawyers.  However, there is little case law
and little in-depth analysis on whether and in what circumstances the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrines can be applied to
protect communications, interactions, and work developed between
claim funders, lawyers, and claim holders—both before the funder has
invested and afterwards.  This Article fills that gap by exploring the
way the doctrine has been applied in other contexts (including patent
law, public relations, and insurance) to predict how the doctrine might
be applied in the claim funding context.
343. See, e.g., Steinitz, supra note 39, at 484 (describing the “distaste for nonparty profiteering
from litigation, a concern about commodification of causes of action, and an objection to the use
of the taxpayer-funded court system for investment purposes”); Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of
Two Models: Third Party Litigation in Historical and Ideological Perspective 18 (Sept. 25, 2009)
(unpublished paper presented at the Third Party Financing of Litigation Roundtable, Searle Ctr.,
Northwestern Univ. Law Sch., Sept. 2009) (on file with the Pritzker Legal Research Center,
Northwestern University Law School); see also VICKI WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS: LAW,
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Despite assumptions to the contrary, my analysis leads to two con-
clusions.  First, there is more than one exception to the attorney-client
privilege doctrine that might apply to protect communications be-
tween claim funders, claim holders, and their lawyers: the agency ex-
ception, the functional equivalent exception, and the common-interest
doctrine.  Second, despite its breadth, the work-product doctrine
might not be interpreted to apply depending on the test the court uses
and also the court’s approach to analyzing the common-interest doc-
trine—a doctrine that is more commonly associated with the attorney-
client privilege but that has been used by courts to demonstrate
waiver of work-product protection as well.
Understanding that interactions and communications between
claim holders, funders, and attorneys can be protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege and work-product doctrines in certain circum-
stances, the question is whether they should be.  Invariably, such a
question could collapse into an analysis of whether we should allow
claim funding at all—and for that matter whether there should exist
any privilege doctrines in the corporate context.  Therefore, I tackle
the normative question by analyzing whether the problems commonly
associated with claim funding are intensified when the interactions be-
tween claim holders, funders, and lawyers are protected.  Ultimately, I
conclude that applying the exceptions to waiver and the work-product
doctrine to protect these interactions may, instead of increasing the
risks and negative externalities of claim funding, perhaps help protect
against them while at the same time potentially yield benefits yet
unexplored.
As a result, I conclude with doctrinal and practical recommenda-
tions.  First, I recommend that courts adopt one of the more lenient
interpretations of the common-interest doctrine.  By doing so, both
doctrines (the attorney-client privilege and work-product) can be con-
sistently and predictably applied to protect communications at issue in
this context.  Second, I urge lawyers to carefully craft contracts so that
they include nondisclosure and statements of common-interest agree-
ments.  In sum, I end with a word of caution.  Despite the doctrinal
support for the existence of a common interest between claim funders
and claim holders, because of the common problems associated with
claim funding and the common distaste for the commodification of
law, claim funders, claim holders, and their lawyers should approach
issues around confidentiality with care.
